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How do people cope when they feel uninformed or unable to understand important social issues, 
such as the environment, energy concerns, or the economy? One would intuitively expect that a 
lack of knowledge would motivate an increased, unbiased search for information, thereby 
facilitating participation and engagement in these issues – especially when they are 
consequential, pressing, and self-relevant. However, there appears to be a discrepancy between 
the importance/self-relevance of social issues and people’s willingness to engage with and learn 
about them. Drawing from the literature on System Justification Theory (Jost & Banaji, 1994), I 
hypothesized that, rather than motivating an increased search for information, a lack of 
knowledge about a specific socio-political issue will (a) foster feelings of dependence on the 
government, which will (b) increase system justification and government trust, which will (c) 
increase desires to avoid learning about the relevant issue when information is negative or when 
information valence is unknown. In other words, I suggest that ignorance – as a function of the 
system justifying tendencies it may activate – may, ironically, breed more ignorance. The 
rational for these predictions is discussed in Chapter 1. Then, in the contexts of energy, 
environmental, and economic issues, I present seven studies that: (a) provide evidence for this 
specific psychological chain (i.e., ignorance about an issue → dependence → government trust 
→ avoidance of information about that issue); (b) shed light on the role of threat and motivation 
in driving the second and third links in this chain; and (c) illustrate the unfortunate consequences 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
“No you will not teach or show that propagandist Al Gore video to my child, blaming our nation 
– the greatest nation ever to exist on this planet – for global warming.” (Frosty E. Hardison, 
outraged parent, quoted in The Washington Post, January 25, 2007) 
In the 2006 documentary An Inconvenient Truth, Al Gore employs an especially dramatic 
method for conveying to his audience the potential effects of rising carbon dioxide levels on 
global temperature.  Positioned beside a slide with the atmosphere’s forecasted CO2 levels 
plotted along the vertical axis of a graph, Gore places himself on an automated lift that takes him 
nearly to the ceiling of the lecture hall. He does this so that he can illustrate just how sharp and 
unprecedented of a rise in CO2 levels are predicted a mere 50 years into the future.  
Al Gore’s reason for employing these theatrics is no doubt to hammer home the 
magnitude of the problem humankind faces, with the hope that forcing people to recognize the 
complexity of the problem will motivate them to take action – an idea that, on the surface, makes 
intuitive sense. The more powerfully one conveys the severity of a given problem, the logic goes, 
the more motivated people should be to address this problem. Recent research on processes of 
system justification, however, suggests this may not be the case.  
People do not passively evaluate the political systems and institutions within which they 
function; rather, they rely and depend on these types of external systems to cope with a host of 
existential and epistemic psychological needs and threats (Jost & Hunyady, 2005; Kay, Gaucher, 
Napier, Callan, & Laurin, 2008). Just as close others and social groups help individuals cope 
with various psychological needs and problems (e.g., Fritsche, Jonas, & Fankhänel, 2008; 
Harkins, Latané , & Williams, 1980; Latané, Williams, & Harkins, 1979; Tajfel & Turner, 1986), 




proposes that individuals are motivated to see the systems that they live in as legitimate, fair, and 
just. This is in part because of our dependence on these systems (Kay et al., 2009; van der Toorn 
et al., 2010) to fulfill various psychological needs, such as creating order and structure in the 
world (compensatory control theory; Kay et al., 2008). When one is dependent on a given 
system, and when it helps to satisfy various psychological needs, it is threatening to think of it as 
unfair, or illegitimate. As such, to the extent that an important issue is presented to people in a 
way that makes it appear especially complex, rather than motivating increased individual effort 
at addressing that issue, it may elicit increased dependence on the government, and this 
dependence may translate into increased system support, and increased avoidance of information 
that might challenge this comforting view of the government as being capable, fair, and 
legitimate. Thus, the fact that An Inconvenient Truth promises troubling information about 
climate change might motivate people unfamiliar with climate change – that is, those who see it 
as a complex problem – to avoid seeing it, because maintaining unfamiliarity is an ideal way to 
protect the psychologically comfortable (even if inaccurate) belief that the government is taking 
care of the problem.   
In the current research, I draw from system justification theory (Jost & Banaji, 1994) and 
compensatory control theory (a theory that builds upon system justification; Kay et al., 2008) to 
understand the development and function of this “ignorance is bliss” approach to social issues, 
and how it may hinder messages regarding important social issues from gaining greater public 
attention. I propose that when an important issue is cast as increasingly complex, people will 
respond by psychologically “outsourcing” responsibility for understanding and handling the 
issue to the government (Kay et al., 2008), causing them to, in turn: feel more dependent on the 




learning about the issue, that could shatter this faith in the government. I provide seven studies 
illustrating this psychological chain of effects across a number of domains, including the 
economy, energy, and natural resources. 
The Prevalence and Consequences of Unfamiliarity Surrounding Important Social Issues 
 Research shows that even as the average education level of Americans has increased, the 
public’s knowledge of politics have stagnated, or even decreased over the latter half of the 
twentieth century (Delli Carpini, & Keeter, 1991). Individuals are often confronted with political, 
economic, and scientific information that they do not comprehend or know how to evaluate, even 
though this information can be of critical personal and societal importance. For example, in the 
case of energy resources, nearly 40% of respondents in a Public Agenda (2009) survey could not 
identify a fossil fuel. Nearly a third could not identify a renewable energy source and incorrectly 
believed that solar energy contributes to global warming. This lack of knowledge should be of 
concern to these individuals, as 89% of respondents report that they worry about increasing fuel 
costs, and 71% worry about global warming. 
The economy serves as another example. Approximately half of surveyed adults did not 
know what an increase in gross domestic product meant, and thought that “money holds its value 
well in times of inflation” (National Council on Economic Education, 2005). Worse still, in a 
national survey of American adults, 54% of respondents did not know what a subprime mortgage 
was (Center for Economic and Entrepreneurial Literacy, 2009), despite the fact that the subprime 
mortgage crisis was a significant contributor to the economic recession that began in 2008, and 
almost certainly affected some substantial portion of those surveyed. In short, it is apparent that a 




there is sometimes a discrepancy between how much people know about social issues and the 
importance and relevance of those issues to people’s day-to-day lives.  
Energy and the economy represent just two important, self-relevant domains about which 
people can feel uncertain, both in terms of how they operate at a societal level and how people 
should act on them. This kind of unfamiliarity can be problematic for day to day functioning, and 
can also be psychologically stressful. Epistemic uncertainty compromises our ability to predict 
the future (Hogg, 2007) and our ability to take relevant actions. Furthermore, actions that are 
made under these circumstances are at an increased risk of being inappropriate or costly 
(Dunning, Johnson, Ehrlinger, & Kruger, 2003; Maki & Berry, 1984; Sinkavich, 1995). Research 
has powerfully illustrated that a lack of knowledge in domains such as energy and the 
environment can lead to bad decisions and erroneous beliefs that hinder a society’s ability to 
create change in domains that require it (Attari, DeKay, Davidson, & Bruine de Bruin, 2010; 
Larrick & Soll, 2008). 
The need to manage uncertainty, therefore, has been identified as a critical motive that 
determines behaviour (Hogg, 2007; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996; Neuberg et al., 1997, van den 
Bos, 2009). How do people react, then, when they find themselves unknowledgeable about a 
specific domain? Feeling unknowledgeable might emerge from one’s unfamiliarity with the 
domain or issue at hand, or because of the technical complexity and sophistication of the domain 
or issue at hand. Logically, one might imagine they would simply try to learn more, thereby 
making themselves familiar and knowledgeable. A considerable amount of research, however, 
suggests that people often engage in more psychologically defensive, and less work intensive, 
processes when confronted with uncertainty (Hogg, 2007; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996; 




propose a novel way in which this defensiveness may manifest itself.  Feeling unknowledgeable 
in the context of broad social issues may breed a unique form of psychological coping – one that 
holds the potential to powerfully undermine individual action. Namely, feeling unknowledgeable 
should instigate feelings of dependence on those who manage the system (i.e., the government), 
and in turn, increase trust in the government and the status quo, which can then be protected by 
the intentional avoidance of learning more about the issue at hand. The logic underlying each of 
these links is explained below.  
From Unfamiliarity to Dependence. Given the psychological discomfort associated with 
epistemic uncertainty, one appealing way to deal with the anxiety of being unable to comprehend 
or manage information is to simply outsource personal responsibility to supposed qualified 
others. This strategy may, at times, be considerably more appealing than seeking out knowledge 
and information for oneself, which assumes that people have the time and ability to sift through 
challenging, and potentially threatening, information. The amount of information available to us 
to sort, comprehend, and assimilate has substantially increased due to technological advances, all 
of which compete for our time and attention. As a result, trade-offs have been made over time 
whereby individual citizens have forfeited a certain amount of autonomy by placing the burden 
onto systems of power comprising of knowledgeable others. Society has prescribed that, for 
example, our health is managed by health professionals, our buildings by engineers and 
contractors, and relevant to the current research, our social and economic security is managed by 
agencies of the government.  Indeed, survey data shows that 88% of adult respondents thought it 
was very important for politicians to have a good understanding of economics, whereas only 
62% thought the same about average citizens (National Council on Economic Education, 2005). 




institutions and other people (Schwartz, 1994), and are willing to cede personal control to experts 
in the hopes that they can make better decisions for us (de Charms, 1968; Deci & Ryan, 1985; 
Iyengar & Lepper, 2000; Langer & Rodin, 1976; Lepper, 1983; Malone & Lepper, 1987; Schulz, 
1976; Taylor, 1989; Zuckerman, Porac, Lathin, Smith, & Deci, 1978).   
Although this form of outsourcing may be psychologically liberating in some ways, it 
may not be an optimal arrangement when it comes to issues that require behaviour and change at 
the level of the individual. The bystander effect (Darley & Latané, 1968) and diffusion of 
responsibility (Latané & Darley, 1970) serve as examples of what can happen when people too 
eagerly outsource responsibility onto others. Furthermore, whereas an unstable building or a 
tumor can only be effectively managed by the capable hands of an expert engineer or doctor, 
respectively, it can be argued that only the collaborative efforts of individual citizens can help to 
resolve issues such as global warming or economic recessions, to the extent that these issues are 
caused, at least in part, by the collective. But, to the extent people feel overwhelmed or confused 
by social issues, they may come to feel as dependent on the government to solve environmental 
and economic problems as they are on engineers to fix an unstable physical structure. 
From Dependence to Trust 
When the complexity of a domain causes people to feel unable to exert any control over 
it, and they instead defer to the government to manage that issue, how do they respond to this 
dependence? One might assume that feelings of dependence would lead people to hold 
authorities to a higher standard and scrutinize their actions more fervently, as their actions and 
decisions may be relevant to the self. However, the system justification and compensatory 




Kay, 2010; van der Toorn et al., 2010) suggest just the opposite, and instead predict that 
dependence will lead to increased trust. 
Being actively critical of something one is dependent upon is thought to be 
psychologically uncomfortable, and therefore avoided in favor of increased perceptions of 
legitimacy, trust, and desirability. System justification theory posits that individuals are 
motivated to justify and legitimize the status quo and the systems in which they live (Jost & 
Banaji, 1994). Many contextual triggers for this motive have been proposed and studied, 
including threats to the system (Kay, Jost, & Young, 2005), decreases in personal control (Kay et 
al., 2008), feelings of restricted exit (Laurin, Shepherd, & Kay, 2010), and feelings of 
dependence on the system (Kay et al., 2009; van der Toorn et al., 2010). In such situations, 
instead of becoming increasingly critical of a system that one is dependent on, which would 
cause considerable dissonance and psychological discomfort, individuals have been shown to 
become increasingly motivated to justify and legitimize that system. For example, following a 
manipulation that reminded participants of the difficulties in leaving a given system, participants 
became more forgiving of that system’s faults and more opposed to critics of the system (Laurin 
et al., 2010). Likewise, increasing participants’ perceived dependence on their country or their 
university led them to increasingly support the funding decisions made by their country or their 
university, respectively (Kay et al., 2009; Study 2), and increasingly defend the demographics of 
their governing body (Kay et al., 2009, Study 3). Thus, there is good reason to believe that once 
something (such as feeling unknowledgeable about an issue) causes people to feel more 
dependent on the government, they will then defensively place more trust in the government, 





From Trust to Avoidance 
 To the extent that people increasingly trust or justify the legitimacy of an authority to 
cope with their dependence on it, they should be motivated to avoid information that could 
potentially rupture this trust. For example, an individual may be quick to turn the page upon 
seeing the headline, “Economy Flounders, Despite the Federal Stimulus?” because in reading the 
article, they run the risk of learning that the government is not as capable as they would like to 
believe. Even a news story with the innocuous title, “Tracking the US Economy” may contain 
challenging information, and thus be avoided.  By doing so, one can protect the psychologically 
comforting idea that the government has everything under control.  
 As cognitive dissonance theory would predict, people tend to avoid information that is 
dissonant with their current beliefs and seek consonant information (Adams, 1961; Rhine, 1967), 
especially when they are already committed to a particular position (Frey & Rosch, 1984) and/or 
the information is self-relevant (Jonas, Schulz-Hardt, & Dieter, 2005). For example, smokers are 
less likely than non-smokers to seek out information that bolsters the link between smoking and 
cancer, religious individuals are less inclined to clarify and listen to a message attacking 
Christianity than non-religious individuals (Brock & Balloun, 1967), and both supporters and 
opponents of gun control and affirmative action seek out confirming information and avoid 
attitude-incongruent information (Taber & Lodge, 2006). Drawing on this evidence of 
dissonance-motivated information avoidance, I suggest that once people have placed their trust 
in the government to deal with a specific issue, especially one that is threatening, they should 
increasingly avoid any information that may potentially challenge this psychologically 




This final prediction – that people will actively avoid learning about issues that they trust 
in the government to handle – adds a feedback loop to my model. That is, I suggest that 
unfamiliarity with a domain or issue will lead to the avoidance of issue-relevant information that 
could threaten one’s trust in the government, and as such, maintain one’s level of unfamiliarity 
and disengagement with the issue at hand. This is particularly troublesome for domains like the 
environment and the economy that require increased public knowledge and coordinated 
individual action to thrive (Attari et al., 2010; Larrick & Soll, 2008). 
Overview of the Present Research 
 I propose that feeling unknowledgeable will enhance feelings of government dependence, 
which will then predict increased trust in the government and the status quo. The belief that the 
government has things under control can then be maintained by avoiding potentially negative 
information about that domain. Across seven studies, I provide evidence for the various links in 
this model in the context of several different domains, such as natural resources, the 
environment, natural disasters, and the economy.  
Figure 1: Overview of proposed model. 
 
Study 1 explores the extent to which feeling unknowledgeable about a domain or issue 
increases trust in the government to manage that domain or issue. Study 2 explores whether or 
not this effect is due to an increase in perceived government dependence. Studies 3 and 4 
investigate the extent to which feeling unknowledgeable also produces a motivation to avoid 
















government and the avoidance of potentially threatening information. Finally, Study 7 tests the 

























Chapter 2: Feeling Unknowledgeable Motivates Trust in Authorities 
In Study 1, I tested the hypothesis that feeling unknowledgeable in a given domain will 
increase participants’ level of trust in those who manage that domain. Participants read either 
simple or complex descriptions of energy sources, and then, for each energy source, indicated 
their level of trust in the government to manage that source of energy. I predicted that those in 
the complex condition would report higher trust in the government to manage that energy source 
because the perceived complexity of the domain should undermine confidence in their own 
personal understanding. This inflated trust in government is hypothesized to be the outcome of a 
psychologically defensive process because the more obviously rational response would be to 
trust any manager of a problem less as the perceived complexity of that problem increases.   
Method 
Participants. Forty-eight (27 men, 20 women, 1 unidentified) undergraduates completed 
the study in a public space on campus in exchange for a chocolate bar. 
Procedure and materials. Participants were invited to participate in a study entitled, 
“Opinions on New Energy Technologies.” Participants read about two novel energy sources: 
Plasma Toroid Fusion and Electrodynamic Fusion. These technologies are only experimental, 
and were thus chosen because of their obscurity. Participants were randomly assigned to one of 
two conditions. In the “simple” condition, the description of how these two energy sources 
worked was explained in fairly simple terms, with as little jargon and technical wording as 
possible. In contrast, in the “complex” condition, the two descriptions used more technical jargon 
and made little attempt to help the uninformed reader, with the goal of inducing the feeling of 




As a manipulation check, each description was followed by two items assessing 
participants’ understanding of the description: “I can easily understand how this method of 
supplying energy works,” and “This is a difficult idea to grasp” (reverse). Responses were made 
on a nine-point scale (1 = Strongly Disagree, 9 = Strongly Agree). Responses were coded such 
that higher scores indicate more perceived understanding. These items formed a four-item 
composite (two items per energy source; α = .84). 
To introduce the dependent variables, participants read the following preamble:  
“In Canada, there are a number of agencies that deal with Canada’s national energy plan, 
including The Canadian National Energy Board (NEB), Natural Resources Canada, and the 
Ministry of Energy. These groups are made up of various scientists, politicians, policy 
makers, etc. The questions below pertain to these groups as a whole.” 
      Participants were then asked to indicate how much they trust these groups to manage 
each energy source on the following 4 items: “To what extent do you trust these groups to 
appropriately deal with any issues that are associated with this source of energy?”, “To what 
extent do you trust these groups to manage this source of energy properly?” (1 = Not at All, 9 = 
Entirely), “While this method of energy may have some faults, I think that these groups can deal 
with them accordingly,” and “Even though there are some important issues that may come with 
using this technology as a source of energy, I think that these groups will be able to deal with 
them” (1 = Strongly Disagree, 9 = Strongly Agree). These eight items (four per energy source) 
formed a reliable composite, α = .96. 




Manipulation check. An independent samples t-test found that those in the complex 
condition understood the two energy sources less well (M = 3.28, SD = 1.65) than those in the 
simple condition (M = 5.24, SD = 1.71), t(46) = 4.01, p < .001, d = 1.18 
Primary results and discussion. An independent samples t-test tested the effect of 
condition (simple vs. complex) on trust. As predicted, those in the complex condition trusted the 
government more to manage the two energy sources (M = 6.31, SD = 1.43) than did those in the 
simple condition (M = 5.39, SD = 1.57), t(46) = 2.09, p = .04, d =.61. These results provide 
preliminary support for the hypothesis that when people do not understand the complexities of a 
domain, they will show increased trust in the government to manage that domain. Why did this 
effect occur? The model presented in the introduction (see Figure 1) presumes that changes in 
government and system trust are driven by intervening changes in feelings of dependence on the 















Chapter 3: Does Dependence Mediate the Effect of Feeling Unknowledgeable on Trust? 
Study 2 builds on the findings of Study 1 in a number of ways. First, I included a measure 
of government dependence before the measures of government trust which allowed me to test 
whether dependency mediated the effect of feeling unknowledgeable on trust. Second, in 
addition to the direct measure of government trust, I also included a measure of support for a 
specific governmental procedure that gives governmental officials, not scientists, the final say on 
matters of energy, thus aligning the current research even more directly with that of past system 
justification research showing that government dependences leads to increased support for the 
status quo (Kay et al., 2009). Finally, Study 2 uses a different form of energy (cellulosic biofuel) 
that is more familiar to people, thus allowing for a replication of Study 1 in a different context.  
Method 
 Participants. Forty-six undergraduates (22 men, 24 women) completed the study online 
for partial course credit. 
 Procedure and materials. Similar to Study 1, participants read either a simple or complex 
description of an energy source – in this case, cellulosic biofuel (Appendix B). As a 
manipulation check, participants completed three items assessing their understanding of this 
description. Two items were the same as those in Study 1, as well as, “Understanding this is 
beyond my capability” (1 = Strongly Disagree, 9 = Strongly Agree); α = .88. Items were coded 
so that higher scores indicate more understanding. 
Participants were then presented with a screen with the following instructions: 
“The relationship between the government and the public can be summarized in a number of 




the following pictures according to how well you think they represent/symbolize the 
relationship between the government and the public, as you see it.” 
 Participants were then presented with a series of images depicting various actors 
interacting in various ways, with the relevant characters in the image labeled “public” and 
“government,” so that participants could rate the theme depicted by the images, and how it might 
represent the relationship between the government and the public (1 = Not at all representative, 9 
= Very representative). Five critical images depicted themes of dependence, α = .66. Other 
images depicted themes of caring/affection, conflict, and equality (Appendix C).  
 Following this, participants completed two separate measures of trust in the government. 
Participants read about the different government groups responsible for making decisions 
regarding energy in Canada (as in Study 1), and then completed six items assessing their level of 
trust in the government to manage cellulosic biofuel if it was implemented in Canada. These 
items included the same four trust items from Study 1, with the addition of, “These groups would 
only use cellulosic biofuel if they were 100% sure they could manage it effectively,” and “When 
it comes to managing cellulosic biofuel, these groups know what they are doing” (1 = Strongly 
Disagree, 9 = Strongly Agree); α = .86.  
Participants then completed a series of items serving to measure their endorsement of what 
were said to be extant governmental procedures regarding energy. First, participants read the 
following preamble: 
“As mentioned, government decisions regarding energy are determined by a number 
of government groups, agencies, and Ministries. These groups are informed by both 
academic and applied biologists, chemists, and engineers. The role of these experts 




decisions regarding energy are determined by the politicians who make up these 
groups.” 
Then, participants were presented with five items assessing their opinion on this state of 
affairs: “To what extent should decisions regarding energy be made by politicians?” (1 = Not at 
All, 9 = Entirely), “How much say should scientists and engineers have in the decision-making 
process when it comes to energy?” (reverse coded) (1 = None, 9 = All), “It is reasonable for 
politicians to make the final decisions on matters related to energy,” “Decisions regarding energy 
should be left to politicians,” (1 = Strongly Disagree, 9 = Strongly Agree), and “How desirable is 
it for the government to be the ones who manage and regulate Canada’s energy?” (1 = Not at All, 
9 = Very). These ratings were averaged for a reliable composite measure of support for the status 
quo; α = .81.  
Results 
 Manipulation check. As in Study 1, participants who read the complex description felt 
less knowledgeable about cellulosic biofuel (M = 4.51, SD = 1.76) than those who read the 
simple description (M = 7.23, SD = 1.68), t(44) = 5.36, p < .001, d =1.62. 
 Primary results. An independent samples t-test revealed that, as predicted, condition 
significantly predicted both measures of government trust. Those in the complex condition 
trusted the government more to manage cellulosic biofuel (M = 5.37, SD = 1.39) than those in 
the simple condition (M = 4.53, SD = 1.43), t(44) = 2.01, p = .05, d = .61. Similarly, those in the 
complex condition were also more supportive of the government’s current decision making 
procedures regarding energy (M = 4.17, SD = 1.19) than those in the simple condition (M = 3.37, 




Dependence as a mediator between complexity and trust. To test whether or not 
perceived dependence mediated the relation between complexity and trust, I first tested whether 
a simple vs. complex framing of cellulosic biofuel influenced perceptions of dependence on the 
government. A one-way ANOVA revealed that participants in the complex condition found 
dependence-themed images more representative of the relationship between the government and 
the public (M = 5.13, SD = 1.36) than did those in the simple condition (M = 4.28, SD = 1.17), 
t(44) = 2.27, p = .03, d = .68. I then tested whether or not dependence predicted trust in the 
government. Because trust in the government and support for the government’s current decision 
making procedures were significantly correlated with one another (r = .49, p = .001), they were 
collapsed into a single variable for the mediational analyses by averaging across all eleven items. 
Then, using a bootstrapping test of mediation (MacKinnon, Lockwood, & Williams, 2004; 
Preacher & Hayes, 2004; Shrout & Bolger, 2002), the indirect pathway from condition, to 
perceived dependence, to trust in the government was tested. The bootstrapping procedure tests 
whether or not this indirect path is significantly different from zero, with significant mediation 
occurring when the upper and lower limits of the 95% confidence interval (CI) do not cross zero. 
Standardized coefficients and significance values are presented in Figure 2. Perceptions of 
dependence on the government did indeed predict increased trust in the government, and the 
indirect path from condition, to dependence, to trust was significant (CI =.03 to .31, p = .01). In 
other words, perceived dependence significantly mediated the relation between feeling 






Figure 2: Effect of energy source complexity on government trust, mediated by perceptions of 
government dependence. 
 
*p < .05, **p < .001 (two-tailed). 
The domain complexity manipulation did not have any effect on ratings of images that 
had themes of caring/affection between the government and the public, or equality between the 
government and the public, ts < .31, ps > .75. Condition did have a marginal effect on ratings of 
images depicting themes of conflict/combativeness, such that participants in the complex 
condition found conflict-themed images marginally less representative of the relationship 
between the government and the public (M = 4.61, SD = 1.60) than did those in the simple 
condition (M = 5.50, SD = 1.78), t(1,44) = 1.79, p = .08. Seeing conflict images as more 
representative of the relationship between the government and the public did not predict scores 
on the composite government trust measure, r = -.23, p = .12, Furthermore, the mediation effect 
was still significant when controlling for ratings of combative images in each step of the 
mediation model. 
It is worth noting that reversing the mediator and the dependent variable, such that 
government trust mediates the relation between condition and dependence, also yielded a 
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dependence that mediates the effect of condition on trust, as opposed to trust mediating the effect 
of condition on dependence. This is because a) past research has provided evidence for the causal 
link between dependence and system justification processes (Kay et al., 2009; van der Toorn et 
al., 2010), and b) the results of Study 7 in the current thesis provide further evidence for the 
particular orientation of my model. A more general discussion of the role of dependence in my 
model is discussed in Chapter 9 (General Discussion). 
Discussion 
 Study 2 found that feeling unknowledgeable in a given domain can lead people to 
perceive the public as increasingly dependent on the government. Building on Study 1, the 
results of Study 2 show that the effect of domain complexity on trust is driven, at least in part, by 
feelings of dependence on the government. Study 2 also found that perceptions of dependence 
that followed from feeling unknowledgeable also predicted increased support for the status quo, 
thus enhancing the link between the current research and past system justification research (Kay 
et al., 2009; van der Toorn et al., 2010). Together Studies 1 and 2 support my hypothesis that 
people defensively inflate their trust in the government’s handling of a given problem when their 
confidence in their own understanding of that problem is undermined. Framing energy resources 
in a way that makes them seem more complex, and thus less comprehensible, make people feel 
more dependent on the government to manage energy resources, which in turn increases their 
trust in the quality of the government’s handling of the problem. The fact that domain 
complexity undermines perceptions of personal competence within that domain but enhances 
perceptions of government competence within that domain suggests a psychologically defensive 
process because the more obviously rational pattern would be for increased domain complexity 




Chapter 4: Does Feeling Unknowledgeable Predict Avoidance? 
 Study 3 departs from the previous studies in a number of ways. First, Study 3 examines 
the extent to which domain complexity also predicts motivated avoidance, or in other words, the 
desire to avoid potentially disconfirming information. Second, I recruited a public sample of 
Americans for participation as opposed to Canadian university students. Third, I measured 
participants’ self-reported level of perceived issue complexity as opposed to manipulating it, so 
as to ensure that the previously observed effects are not limited to something idiosyncratic about 
the manipulations used or the act of manipulating complexity in general. Finally, the issue of 
interest in Study 3 is the possibility of a future oil shortage. 
If perceived domain complexity leads people to feel dependent on the government – thus 
increasing their investment in seeing the government as capable and competent – then it follows 
that people may be motivated to protect this comforting view from potentially conflicting 
information. In contrast, when an issue is seen as rather simple and comprehensible, then these 
dependence-related concerns should be less prevalent (Study 2), and thus there should be less 
reason to avoid potentially threatening information. This hypothesis was tested in Study 3 by 
testing the link between perceived domain complexity and the desire to avoid potentially 
troubling information about America’s oil supply. 
 Study 3 also sought to test whether or not this is a defensive process. If issue complexity 
leads people to depend on the government and, in turn, invest greater trust in the government so 
as to protect them from threat, then it is expected that the effect of complexity on information 
avoidance should emerge especially when an issue is serious and urgent. In other words, I expect 




intuitively, one might expect issue complexity to motivate increased desire for understanding and 
engagement: when an issue is framed as most pressing or imminent. 
In the current study I manipulate the imminence of a potential oil shortage by framing the 
issue as more vs. less urgent (only 40 vs. 240 years of recoverable oil left, respectively). I predict 
increased levels of avoidance by those who see the issue as more (vs. less) complex, and that this 
effect will be moderated by threat, such that this effect will emerge when the issue is urgent and 
immediate as opposed to in the distant future.  Again, this is a counter-intuitive prediction, in that 
one would assume that the desire to engage in a complex, poorly understood issue should only 
increase as that issue becomes more urgent. Indeed, when they decide what events to cover 
journalists routinely assume that the public will prefer information about the issues of most 
immediate, personal relevance over information about more remote matters (Hofstetter & Buss, 
1978; Chang, Shoemaker, & Bredlinger, 1987). And when asked what influence the amount of 
attention they pay to news stories, people cite personal relevance and societal importance as two 
of the most important factors (Graber, 1988). However, my model, which postulates that 
information avoidance is a defensive processes of threat management, predicts the exact 
opposite. 
Method 
 Participants. A sample of 163 Americans (70 men, 93 women; age, M = 32.5, SD = 
10.79) were recruited using an online recruitment website.  
 Procedure and materials. Participants were first asked for their opinions regarding  the 
complexity of natural resource management and extraction via three items: “The detailed 
workings of managing an energy resource like oil or coal at a national level is ‘above my head’,” 




complex,” and “When I really think about it, the sheer number of things to take into 
consideration when deciding how to manage our energy resources is overwhelming” (1 = 
Strongly Disagree, 9 = Strongly Agree); α = .84. Responses were coded so that higher scores 
reflected perceptions of greater complexity. 
 Participants were then presented with a passage titled “Are we running out of oil?” 
(ostensibly taken from an energy website). This served as a manipulation of issue urgency. The 
manipulation read as follows (italicized content in brackets differs by condition): 
“The United States uses more oil than just about any industrialized nation in the 
world at about 20 million barrels of oil per day. 98% of cars in the United States use 
gasoline. Oil appears to be the bedrock upon which power for our cars, trucks, 
farming equipment, etc., is generated in this country. Of course, there is only so 
much oil to go around. It is a finite resource. One day, we will run out of it. As 
recently as 2007, the government estimated that the United States has upwards of 
240 years [only 40 years] of economically recoverable oil available to us. [Of 
course, the strain will be felt much sooner.]” 
Participants then completed four items assessing their desire to avoid learning more about a 
potential oil shortage. These items were carefully worded so as to reflect a motivation to actively 
avoid information pertaining to the issue, as opposed to a general lack of interest in learning 
about the issue. These items included, “When it comes to running out of oil, I would be more 
comfortable to just turn a blind eye to the issue,” “When it comes to America’s oil situation, I 
would rather not know just how bad it is,” “I would prefer to know the whole story when it 
comes to America’s energy concerns regardless of how much the truth hurts” (reverse), and 




how serious those problems are” (1 = Strongly Disagree, 9 = Strongly Agree). These items were 
averaged together into a reliable composite measure of information avoidance, α = .86. 
Results 
 A condition (immediate problem vs. distant problem) X perceived issue complexity 
(continuous: less vs. more complex) interaction was submitted to regression analysis. Perceived 
complexity (centered) and condition were submitted to the first step of the analysis, while the 
interaction between these variables was submitted to the second step. As predicted, perceived 
complexity predicted avoidance, β = .27, t(160) = 3.52, p = .001, such that those who saw 
resource management as more complex reported an increased desire to avoid learning about a 
potential future oil shortage. The main effect of the urgency manipulation was not significant, β 
= .06, t(160) = .74, p =.46. Importantly, however, the predicted two-way interaction between the 
urgency manipulation and perceived complexity emerged as significant, β = .27, t(159) = 1.95, p 
= .05, d = .31. The simple slopes for perceived complexity predicting avoidance within each of 
the urgency framing conditions were then analyzed. Critically, and as predicted, perceived 
complexity was a significant predictor of avoidance when the issue was framed as being an 
immediate problem, β = .41, t(159) = 3.90, p < .001, d = .62, such that participants avoided the 
issue of resource management more to the extent they saw the issue as more complex. 
Complexity was not a significant predictor of avoidance when the oil shortage was framed as 
being in the distant future, β = .12, t(159) = .1.10, p = .27, d = .17. In addition, the simple effects 
of urgency among those high and low in perceived complexity were analyzed. Perceived 
complexity was re-centered at one standard deviation above and below the mean, and the 
interaction term was recomputed using these new centered variables (Aiken & West, 1991). 




marginally higher when the issue was framed as immediate as opposed to distant, β = .20, t(159) 
= 1.89, p = .057, d = .30. The effect of condition among those who saw resource management as 
more simple was not significant, β = -.10, t(159) = -.92, p = .36, d = .15. 
Figure 3: Desire to avoid learning about a future oil shortage, as a function of perceived domain 
complexity and urgency. 
Discussion 
I have shown thus far that a) feeling unknowledgeable predicts increased trust in the 
government (Study 1), and b) feelings of government dependence mediate this effect (Study 2). 
Study 3 builds on this by illustrating that feeling unknowledgeable (vs. knowledgeable) about a 
given domain predicts an increased motivation to avoid learning more about an issue within that 
domain especially when it is an immediate problem. When the issue was framed as distant and 
non-urgent, feeling unknowledgeable about the domain at hand (i.e., resource management) did 




process – has important ramifications, as it suggests that unfamiliarity drives avoidance 
specifically for those social problems that are, ironically, most in need of immediate redress.  
The avoidance items used in Study 3 were intended to explicitly gauge motivation to 
actively avoid information, giving credence to the hypothesis that participants do not simply lose 
interest in an issue that they do not understand, but rather, that they have a heightened desire to 
avoid the issue at hand. However, these items do not assess the desire to avoid information in 
general; rather, they assess the desire to avoid negative information about the issue, specifically. 
Although avoiding only negative information can bias people’s perspective on an issue 
(especially when the reality of a situation offers little in the way of positive information), and 
may lead to inaction and defense of the status quo, it is not ignorance per se. Therefore, in Study 
4 I aim to show that people will not simply avoid negative information when they feel 
unknowledgeable, but that they will also avoid information when the valence of that information 
cannot be determined. I also examine whether the avoidance of negative (and even ambiguous) 
information relates to the motivation to protect the comforting belief that the government has 
everything under control. Finally, because Study 3 only included hypothetical avoidance 











Chapter 5: What Kind of Information Do People Seek to Avoid?  
 In Study 4, I manipulated participants’ felt understanding of the economy via a 
complexity manipulation (similar to Studies 1 and 2), and measured the extent to which 
participants felt that the current recession affected them directly. Participants’ interest in reading 
various news articles about the economy, based on their title, was then assessed. Titles were 
intended to either imply positive information, negative information, or simply “information” that 
could either be positive or negative (“ambiguous”). Study 4, therefore, explores the extent to 
which people will avoid three different categories of domain-relevant information: positive, 
negative, and ambiguous. These article titles were pre-tested for their level of perceived 
positivity/negativity, as well as the extent to which they were perceived to challenge the idea that 
the government can manage the economy. The results of this pre-testing (below) informed my 
predictions. 
Pre-test results. Sixty-two individuals rated the article titles to be used in Study 4 (see 
Appendix E for article titles). Valence was rated on 9 point scale (-4 = Very Negative, 0 = 
Neutral, +4 = Very Positive), as were ratings of whether or not each article sounded like it would 
challenge the idea that the government can manage the economy (1 = Not At All, 9 = Definitely).  
Results revealed that article titles intended to suggest positive, optimistic information about the 
economy were indeed seen as more positive (M = 1.83, SD = .95) than ambiguously valenced 
article titles (M = -.22, SD = .87, not significantly different from zero), and ambiguous titles were 
seen as being more positive than negative titles (M = -2.10, SD = .84) (all ts > 14.00, all ps < 
.001). There was also a significant relation between article title valence and the expectation that 
the article would challenge the government’s ability to manage the economy; positive article 




ambiguous titles (M = 3.46, SD = 1.70), and finally negative titles were seen as the most likely to 
challenge the government’s ability to manage the economy (M = 4.80, SD = 2.05), all ts >  2.31, 
all ps < .03, ds > .60).  
According to my theoretical model one of the reasons why feeling unknowledgeable 
should lead people to avoid issue-relevant information is because feeling unknowledgeable leads 
to increased perceptions of government dependence, which then leads people to bolster and 
protect the psychologically comforting idea that the government has everything under control. 
This may be achieved by not only avoiding clearly negative information, but also by avoiding 
any information – such as ambiguous information – that holds the potential to be threatening to 
the idea that the government can manage the issue. Only information that is clearly expected to 
be positive in its implications should be immune from this defensive response. Based on these 
pre-test results, therefore, it is predicted that when the issue of the economy is more self-relevant, 
those in the complex (vs. simple) condition should increasingly avoid articles with negative titles 
and ambiguous titles. However, I predict no such avoidance of articles with titles that are clearly 
positive, as these titles assure the participants that their content will be unthreatening. 
Study 4 also contains a self-report measure of general avoidant tendencies in this domain, 
similar to that of Study 3. Again, when the issue of the economy is perceived to be more self-
relevant, those in the complex condition should report a stronger desire to avoid hearing about 
the economy in general, relative to those in the simple condition.  
Method 
 Participants. One hundred ninety-seven American participants (86 men, 111 women, age, 




25 unemployed, 30 student) participated in the current study online via an online recruitment 
website in early 2011, while the U.S. economy was still recovering from a recession.  
Procedure and materials. Participants were first asked to read some information about 
the economy and how it operates, which served as my manipulation of domain complexity. In 
the simple condition, the description of the economy was excerpted from a blog, and explained 
the economy in simple, straightforward terms. In the complex condition, the description of the 
economy came from an economics book chapter, and explained the economy as a complex, non-
linear dynamic system (Appendix D). As a manipulation check, participants were then asked, 
“Overall, the detailed workings of the economy is something that I just ‘don’t get’” (1 = Strongly 
Disagree, 9 = Strongly Agree). To be consistent with previous studies, this item was reverse 
coded so that higher scores reflected an increased sense that one understands how the economy 
operates. 
To measure self-relevance, participants were asked to complete the item, “the current 
economic recession affects me directly” (1 = Strongly disagree, 9 = Strongly agree).  
As a first measure of avoidance, participants were asked to rate their interest in reading a 
series of articles. First, participants received the following instructions:  
“Later in this survey, you may be randomly selected to help us by reading a very 
short article about the economy. Please rate the article titles below to determine your 
preferences, so that we can select one of your more preferred articles (they are about 
the same length). For each article title, please rate whether or not this sounds like an 
article you would like to read, using your first ‘gut-level’ response”. 
Therefore, when participants were rating their interest in reading different news articles 




which article they would be assigned. Participants were then presented with article titles 
from pretesting in random order (three titles for each of the three categories: positive, 
negative, and ambiguous, nine total; see Appendix E for article titles) and rated their 
interest in reading each article (1 = Not at All, 9 = Definitely). To be consistent with my 
other avoidance measures, scores were reverse-coded so that higher scores mean more 
avoidance of that article. Composite scores were formed for positive (α = .82), negative 
(α = .81), and ambiguous article ratings (α = .83).  
As a second measure of economic news avoidance, participants reported their 
agreement with a series of nine statements assessing their desire to avoid negative 
information about the recession, at the cost of not being fully informed. These items 
paralleled those of Study 3: “There are issues with the economy that I would just prefer to 
NOT know about,” “When it comes to the economy, I would be more comfortable to just 
turn a blind eye to it,” “If the economy was worse than I thought, I would certainly want 
to know about it” (reverse), “I would prefer to know the whole story when it comes to 
economy, regardless of how much the truth hurts” (reverse), “I want to be entirely 
informed when it comes to the economy” (reverse), “I don’t like thinking about how the 
struggling economy could/does affect me,” “Because the news on the economy is often 
so bleak, I often just stay away from hearing about it all together,” “The economy is such 
a depressing topic that I tend to just ignore it,” and “Even with the current economic 
troubles, I am still interesting in staying up to date with what is going on in the economy” 
(reverse) (1 = Strongly Disagree, 9 = Strongly Agree). Responses to the items were 
averaged together to form an internally reliable index of self-reported avoidance of 




economic information in general, as opposed to just overtly negative economic 
information.  
Results 
Manipulation check. An independent samples t-test found that those in the complex 
condition reported understanding the economy less well (M = 5.55, SD = 1.65) than those in the 
simple condition (M = 6.10, SD = 1.81), t(195) = -2.13, p = .04, d =.31. 
Main analyses. A series of regression analyses were run predicting participants’ 
interest in reading versus avoiding the three different types of article titles (i.e., positive, 
negative, and ambiguous). Feelings of being affected by the recession (centered) and 
condition (simple vs. complex) were submitted to the first step of the analysis, while the 
interaction between these variables was submitted to the second step.  
Avoidance of negative and ambigious articles. A main effect of self-relevance 
emerged, predicting avoidance of negative articles, β = -.26, t(193) = -2.69, p < .01, d = 
.39, and ambiguous articles, β = -.38, t(193) = -4.13, p < .001, d = .59, such that those 
who felt more affected by the recession showed less avoidance of these articles than those 
who reported feeling less affected – an intuitive response to a self-relevant issue. 
Critically, however, the predicted two-way interaction emerged for negative articles, β 
=.62, t(193) = 3.22, p = .001, d = .46, and for ambiguous articles, β = .38, t(193) = 2.03, p 
= .04, d = .29. 
To analyze the simple effects, the slopes for article interest as a function of 
reported self-relevance of the recession were tested for each condition. To test the effect 




self-relevance was re-centered at one standard deviation above and below the mean, and 
the interaction term was recomputed using these new centered variables.  
First, predicting avoidance of negative articles, simple slopes analyses revealed that in the 
simple condition, feeling affected by the recession was a significant predictor of article interest, β 
= -.52, t(193) = -4.19, p < .001, d = .60, such that participants most affected by the recession 
reported less avoidance. Again, this is an intuitive reaction when faced with a sufficiently 
understandable, self-relevant issue. However, the effect was undone when the economy was 
framed as being complex, β = -.04, t(193) = -.15, p = .88, d = .02. Critically, as predicted, among 
those who reported being most affected by the economic recession, those in the complex 
condition reported more avoidance of negative articles, as compared to those in the simple 
condition, β = .93, t(193) = 2.39, p < .02, d = .34 – the very people who, intuitively, should be 
engaging more in the issue. In other words, the tendency to want to learn more about a self-
relevant issue was undermined by framing the issue as complex. Conversely, among those less 
affected by the recession, the opposite pattern was found, β = -.85, t(193) = -2.19, p = .03, d = 
.32, such that those in the complex condition wanted to read the negative articles more than those 










Figure 4: Avoidance of negative articles as a function of domain complexity and self-relevance 
of the economic recession. 
 
Next, predicting avoidance of ambiguous articles, the same pattern of results emerged. 
Simple slopes analyses revealed that in the simple condition, feeling affected by the recession 
was a significant predictor of article avoidance, β = -.55, t(193) = -4.48, p < .001, d = .64, such 
that participants most affected by the recession reported less avoidance. Again, this effect was 
undone when the economy was framed as being complex, β = -.17, t(193) = 1.18, p = .24, d = 
.17. As predicted, among those who reported being most affected by the economic recession, 
those in the complex condition reported more avoidance of ambiguous articles, as compared to 
those in the simple condition, β = .92, t(193) = 2.44, p < .02, d = .35. Among those less affected 





Figure 5: Avoidance of ambiguous articles, as a function of domain complexity and self-
relevance of the economic recession. 
 
Positive articles. So far we have seen that when participants are induced to feel less 
knowledgeable about the economy, those who feel especially affected by the recession are more 
likely to avoid negative and ambiguous articles about the economy. But what about positive 
articles? I again found a main effect of self-relevance, β = -.42, t(193) = -4.42, p < .001, d = .64, 
such that those most affected by the recession reported less avoidance of positive articles about 
the economy. However, no two-way interaction between condition and self-relevance emerged, β 
= .10, t(193) = .52, p = .61, d = .07; increased self-relevance was related to less avoidance within 
both the simple condition,  β = -.47, t(193) = -3.67, p < .001, d = .53, and the complex condition, 
β = -.37, t(193) = -2.49, p = .01, d = .36. Furthermore, there was no effect of condition among 




although people affected by the recession avoided negative and ambiguous articles more when 
the economy was experienced as complex as opposed to simple, no such effect emerged for 
positive articles. 
Figure 6: Avoidance of positive articles, as a function of domain complexity and self-relevance 
of the economic recession. 
 
General desire to avoid hearing about the economy. Turning to the second 
measure of economic news avoidance, condition, self-relevance ratings, and their 
interaction, were submitted to regression predicting participants’ scores on the nine-item 
self-report measure of a general desire to avoid information about the economy. These 
results paralleled those of the negative and ambiguous article rating measures. A 
significant main effect of self-relevance emerged, β = -.29, t(193) = -3.93, p < .001, d = 




about the economy, which was qualified by the predicted interaction, β = .46, t(193) = 
3.20, p < .01, d = .46. Among those who reported being more affected by the recession, 
those in the complex condition wished to avoid information about the economy more 
than those in the simple condition, β = .74, t(193) = 2.53, p = .01, d = .36. Conversely, 
among those less affected by the recession, the opposite effect was found; those in the 
complex condition reported less desire to avoid information about the economy, 
compared to those in the simple condition, β = -.59, t(193) = 2.02, p < .05, d = .29. 
Furthermore, simple slopes analyses revealed that self-relevance predicted less desire to 
avoid in the simple condition, β = -.48, t(193) = 2.02, p < .05, d = .29; however, this 
intuitive reaction was eliminated in the complex condition,  β = -.02, t(193) = -.21, p = 
















Figure 7: Self-reported desire to avoid hearing about the economy, as a function of domain 
complexity and self-relevance of the economic recession. 
 
Discussion  
Studies 1 – 3 demonstrated that feeling unknowledgeable about an issue predicted a) 
increased trust in the government to manage that issue (Studies 1 and 2), and b) increased 
avoidance of negative information when the issue was more, as opposed to less urgent (Study 3). 
My model, however, proposes that these two outcomes are related, such that when people avoid 
negative information in response to feeling unknowledgeable about an issue, they are doing this 
at least in part to protect the idea that the government has everything in control. Study 4 provides 




the economy, and also felt that the economy affected them directly, they showed increased 
avoidance of information that, in pretesting, was shown to potentially challenge the 
government’s ability to manage the economy. In contrast, unambiguously positive information, 
which had less potential to threaten confidence in the government, was not avoided in this way. 
Study 4, therefore, lends credence to the idea that the link between feeling unknowledgeable 
about an issue and avoiding negative and ambiguous issue relevant information is at least partly 
due to a motivation to protect perceptions of government competence. This idea is further tested 



















Chapter 6: Does Trust in the Government Predict Increased Avoidance? (I) 
Is the avoidance process, as shown in Studies 3 and 4 driven by a motivation to preserve 
the psychologically comforting belief that the government can effectively manage social issues 
(that is, government trust), as I have suggested? Study 4 provides evidence suggesting that this is 
the case, in that when the recession as self-relevant, participants who saw the economy as a 
complex issue vs. simple issue avoided negative and ambiguously valenced information – the 
same information that was seen as more challenging to the idea that the government can manage 
the economy. Study 5 builds on these results by focusing specifically on the link between trust in 
government and avoidance. That is, to assess the role of trust in explaining the relation between 
feeling unknowledgeable and avoidance, I examine the effects of trust in the government on 
people’s desire to seek out vs. avoid potentially challenging, negative information. To meet these 
ends, in Study 5 I manipulate the extent to which the government is seen as capable and 
trustworthy in managing the economy, and then measure how much time participants spend 
reading an educational article about the economy. I predict that when the government is seen as 
capable of managing the economy, participants will spend less time reading the informative 
article about the economy. 
Method 
 Participants. Thirty-five (11 men, 24 women) Canadian undergraduates participated in 
the current study for partial completion of course requirements. The study was run during the 
spring and summer of 2009 when Canada, like the United States and most of Western Europe, 
was in a recession. 
 Procedure and materials. Upon arrival at the laboratory, participants were told that they 




random order: a reading comprehension task, a spatial skills task, and a mathematics task. This 
was all the information that participants were given about the tasks. They then read the following 
instructions: 
“In the following study you will be able to complete a series of tasks. There are three 
tasks, and you have 12 minutes to do any number of them. You by no means have to 
do all of the tasks. Tasks will appear in a random order. If you do not like a given 
task, you may move on to another one; however, once you have left a task you 
cannot go back to it.” 
 In actuality, the reading comprehension task was always presented first and was the only 
task of interest to the current study. When participants began the reading comprehension task, 
they were told that they would be shown a series of articles, and to read the information carefully 
for however long they like, and to not skip sentences or paragraphs.  
 The first article titled “Canada’s Economic Collapse: Can it be Tamed?” served as a 
manipulation of government trust and capability. Participants read one of two versions of the 
article: one version framed the government as being capable of managing the economy, whereas 
the other framed them as being incapable. In the “capable” condition, the article stated that 
recent reports suggest that “our government, as a whole, stabilizes Canada in times of difficulty 
and instability,” and that, “the government plays a huge role in stabilizing the average 
Canadian’s income level, quality of life, cost of living, and investments in times of difficulty.” In 
the “incapable” condition, the article instead said that, “our government, as a whole, is 
unsuccessful at stabilizing Canada in times of difficulty and instability,” and that “the 
government plays a limited role in stabilizing the average Canadian’s income level, quality of 




 Immediately afterwards, once participants finished reading this article, they then pressed 
the “continue” button on the screen to continue to the next article, which served as the dependent 
measure of avoidance. This article was titled, “What Can (if Anything) the Government Do to 
Fix the Economy? Are we in a Recession? How Bad Can the Economy Get?: Economics 101, 
and Understanding the Economic Crisis.” The article that ensued was created by using segments 
of a real article that discusses the recession, how recessions are caused, and what can be done to 
fix them. References to American economics and economic institutions were removed so that the 
article would be relevant to Canadian participants. Although the title hints at talking about the 
government’s role in fixing the economy, the article’s content was not redundant with that of the 
first article. Also, content relevant to the government’s ability did not appear until the latter 
portions of the article. The majority of the article deals with comparing the 2008 recession with 
those of the past, and the causes of the 2008 recession (Appendix G).  
The article was lengthy, and to read it in its entirety would likely take up most of the 
participants’ 12 minutes allotted to them for all the tasks. Therefore, participants were faced with 
the choice of continuing to read the article, or to move on to the next task. As the primary 
dependent variable, the amount of time (total seconds) they spent reading the article was 
measured. To the extent that government trust motivates avoidance, participants led to believe 
that the government is capable and trustworthy in managing the economy should spend less time 
reading the article than those led to believe the government is incapable. 
Result and Discussion 
An independent samples t-test revealed that, as predicted, those in the capable condition 
spent fewer seconds examining the article (M =266.77, SD = 132.00) than did those in the 




participants who were led to trust in the government’s ability to manage the economy spent less 
time subsequently reading an educational article about the economy. This finding supports the 
suggestion that psychological processes that promote defensive trust in the government (such as 
system justification in contexts of unfamiliarity) may also promote an active avoidance of 
knowledge in important domains, including those that require individual participation and 
engagement. 
One could argue, however, that participants in Study 5 were not actively avoiding the 
information so as to protect their faith in the government, but instead simply lost interest in the 
issue, having learned that it is not a pressing problem and therefore unimportant. The results of 
Studies 3 and 4 – in which participants responded to dependent variables that explicitly gauged 
motivation to actively avoid information and in which moderation by issue urgency (Study 3) 
and self-relevance (Study 4) was observed – support my theoretical model over this alternative 
explanation, but it cannot be ruled out from Study 5 alone. Study 6, therefore, seeks to provide 
additional support for the hypothesis that avoiding potentially threatening information, among 
other things, can be a motivated process in the service of maintaining the psychologically 











Chapter 7: Does Trust in the Government Predict Increased Avoidance? (II) 
In Study 6, government trust was manipulated in a similar way as in Study 5. Then 
avoidance was measured using items similar to those in Studies 3 and 4. Critically, self-relevance 
is included as a possible moderator of the effect of trust on avoidance. Specifically, I predicted 
that during the 2010 British Petroleum (BP) oil crisis in the Gulf of Mexico, those living in Gulf 
states, for whom the issue of controlling the oil spill is more self-relevant, would show less 
avoidance of the issue when the government is not trustworthy in dealing with the issue, relative 
to those not living in Gulf states; however, when the government is framed as trustworthy and 
capable of managing the crisis, those in gulf states should then show relatively higher levels of 
avoidance. Again, it is suggested that this serves to maintain the comforting idea that the 
government has everything under control.   
Method 
 Participants. A public sample of 154 American participants (61 men, 93 women; age, M 
= 32, SD = 11.01) were recruited through an online service during the BP oil crisis in 2010, 
where a BP deep-sea oil drilling rig exploded, resulting in a three month unabated oil leak from a 
sea-floor oil well. Twenty-five participants lived in states bordering the Gulf of Mexico (Texas, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida), while 129 participants lived in all other 
remaining states. Data was collected in the Spring of 2010, before the oil leak had been stopped.  
Procedure and materials. Participants were first given a manipulation similar to that from 
Study 5. Participants in the “capable” condition read an ostensibly real news article stating that 
experts agree that the government can be trusted to deal with the BP oil crisis, in that they have 
the resources, interest, and capability to eventually manage it. In contrast, those in the 




of dealing with the issue, that they lack the necessary resources to effectively deal with the issue 
(Appendix H). 
 Then, participants completed items assessing their desire to avoid hearing about the oil 
spill. These items were similar to those of Studies 3 and 4, and assessed the desire and 
motivation to avoid hearing about the issue. These items were, “When it comes to the oil disaster 
in the Gulf, I would be more comfortable to just turn a blind eye to it,” “When it comes to the BP 
oil disaster, I would rather NOT know how bad it is,” “I would prefer to know the whole story 
when it comes to the oil spill in the Gulf, regardless of how much the truth hurts,” (reverse 
coded) “While there may be problems with the current situation in the Gulf, I would rather NOT 
know just how serious those problems are,” “I don’t like thinking about how the oil spill affects 
the wildlife and those living in the area,” “When it comes to the oil spill, sometimes I think I can 
convince myself that there isn’t a problem if I just ignore the issue,” “The BP oil disaster is one 
of those situations where ‘ignorance is bliss’,” and “When it comes to the oil spill in the Gulf, I 
would prefer to think that everything will be okay, even if that isn’t entirely true.” Responses 
were made on a 9-point scale (1 =  Strongly Disagree, 9 = Strongly Agree) and were averaged 
together for an internally reliable index of information avoidance, α = .90. 
Results 
A 2 (government capable vs. incapable) X 2 (location: Gulf state vs. not) ANOVA was 
conducted, predicting participants’ desire to avoid hearing about the BP oil crisis. The predicted 
two-way interaction was significant, F(1,150) = 5.68, p = .02, η
2
 = .04. As predicted, among 
those living in Gulf states, framing the government as being capable of managing the oil leak 
lead to higher levels of avoidance (M = 3.25, SD = 2.10) relative to those who read that the 




although framing the government as incapable lead those in Gulf states to show significantly less 
avoidance (M = 1.81, SD = .65) relative to those in non-Gulf states (M = 3.50, SD = 1.88), t(69) 
= 2.66, p = .01, d = .64, this intuitive reaction to a self-relevant issue was eliminated when the 
government was framed as being capable, with both those in Gulf states (M = 3.25, SD = 2.10), 
and those in non-Gulf states (M = 3.50, SD = 1.88) showing similarly high levels of avoidance, 
t(81) = .28, p = .60. 
Figure 8: Self-reported desire to avoid hearing about the BP oil crisis, as a function of 
government confidence and proximity to the crisis. 
 
Discussion 
 The results of Study 6 are conceptually similar to those of Study 5, such that when the 
government was framed as being capable of effectively dealing with an issue (in this case, the 
BP oil crisis), participants showed higher levels of avoidance. Study 6 builds on Study 5 by 
providing additional evidence for this being a motivated process; those living in Gulf states and 




was framed as incapable of dealing with it; however, this intuitive response of responding to a 
self-relevant issue when no one else can was undermined when the government was framed as 
being capable of managing this issue, such that those most affected by the issue disengaged from 
it, reporting higher levels of avoidance. This effect was not seen among those living in non-Gulf 
states, as they were less/not at all affected by the disaster, and thus did not need to engage in 
such defensive processes. In combination, Studies 5 and 6 provide additional support for the 
hypothesis that the causal link between feeling unknowledgeable about an issue and avoiding 
issue relevant information can, in part, be explained by the need to protect the psychologically 


















Chapter 8: Testing the Entire Motivated Avoidance Model 
 The previous six studies have empirically tested specific components of the motivated 
avoidance model. Feeling unknowledgeable was shown to increase government trust (Studies 1 
and 2), which was driven by feelings of dependence (Study 2). Feeling unknowledgeable also 
increased avoidance among those most motivated to avoid potentially threatening information 
(i.e., when the issue was especially imminent or self-relevant; Studies 3 and 4). Furthermore, 
Study 4 demonstrated that this conditional effect of feeling unknowledgeable (which increases 
trust in the government) on the avoidance of issue-related information only occurs in the context 
of information that participants believe could potentially rupture government trust. Studies 5 and 
6 showed that experimental manipulations of perceived government capability influenced the 
desire to avoid hearing about the issue at hand, such that perceiving the government as more 
capable of dealing with an issue such as the economy (Study 5) or an ecological disaster (Study 
6) leads to higher avoidance. Study 6 found that this effect was unique to those most affected by 
the issue at hand (i.e., those living in the Gulf of Mexico during the BP oil disaster). However, 
no study thus far has tested whether or not the path from dependence to avoidance is statistically 
mediated by government trust, nor has any study tested the entire model at once. Study 7 
addresses these remaining research questions in the context of the economy.  
Study 7 also introduces a measure of perceived helplessness – that is, feeling unable to 
manage the problem individually – as a predictor of the link between feeling unknowledgeable 
and dependence. I propose that people feel dependent on the government because they feel 
helpless to do anything about issues that they do not understand, and feel unable to manage them 
on an individual level, thus explaining the need to see something (i.e., the government) as in 




issue should lead people to feel helpless, and this should in turn lead people to believe that they 
are dependent on the government to deal with the issue. 
In Study 7, I manipulate perceived complexity of the economy, and then observe the 
effects on, in turn, (i) participants’ perceptions that they themselves can do little to help 
themselves during the recession, (ii) their perceptions of dependence on government, (iii) their 
trust in the government to manage the economy, and, finally, (iv) their desire to avoid negative 
information about the economy. Using SEM, I test a model whereby the effect of complexity on 
perceived dependence is mediated by perceptions of helplessness, and the effect of dependence 
on avoidance is mediated by trust in the government, such that when the economy is seen as 
complex, people will feel more helpless, and in turn, report more government dependence, which 
should then predict increased trust in the government, which leads to avoidance of information 
about the economy. 
Method 
 Participants. As in Study 4, I sought a sample that would be likely to experience the 
impact of the economy and the economic downturn the country was experiencing during the time 
of data collection (Spring 2010). A public sample of 58 Canadian participants (20 men, 38 
women; age, M = 42.88 SD = 12.24; 35 employed, 8 retired, 6 disabled, 5 homemaker, 2 
unemployed, 2 not reported) volunteered to participate via an online recruitment service.
 Procedure and materials. Participants were first given the same manipulation and 
manipulation check as in Study 4. Next, measures of perceived helplessness, perceived 
government dependence, trust in the government and information avoidance followed in that 
order.  To measure perceived helplessness, I presented participants with a list of things they 




thrift stores, growing food in your own garden, freelance sales, babysitting, dog walking, etc. See 
Appendix I for all items). Participants were asked to check any items that they felt they could do 
to help get through the recession. The total number of checked items for each participant was 
computed to create a helplessness variable (maximum score of 18), with lower scores reflecting 
more perceived helplessness. 
 Two items measured perceived dependence on the government: “When this recession hits 
people hard, there is really nothing they can do but hope the government can fix things for 
them,” and “To get through this recession, we are pretty much dependent on the government to 
improve things for us.” Responses were made on a 9-point scale (1 =  Strongly Disagree, 9 = 
Strongly Agree). Because these items were highly correlated (r = .82), they were averaged 
together to form an index of perceived dependence of government. 
 Participants then read a similar preamble as in Studies 1 and 2 (this time about the 
agencies responsible for the economy), and then responded to four items assessing their level of 
trust in the government to manage the economy: “To what extent do you trust these groups to 
appropriately deal with any issues associated with the economy?,” “To what extent do you trust 
these groups to manage the economy properly?” (1 = Not at all, 9 = Entirely), “While the 
economy may have some issues right now, I think that these groups can deal with those issues 
accordingly,” and “The people in these political groups would only be there if they were 100% 
sure they could manage the economy effectively” (1 = Strongly Disagree, 9 = Strongly Agree). 
Because these four items were reliably interrelated they were averaged together for an index of 
trust in the government’s handling of the economy; α = .89. 
 Finally, participants completed four items assessing their desire to avoid learning more 




blind eye to it,” “I would prefer to know the whole story when it comes to economy, regardless 
of how much the truth hurts” (reverse), “If the economy was worse than I thought, I would 
certainly want to know about it” (reverse), and “There are issues with the economy that I would 
just prefer to not know about.” Responses were made on a seven-point scale (1 = Strongly 
Disagree, 7 = Strongly Agree). Because these four items were reliably interrelated, they were 
averaged together for an index of avoidance of economic information; α = .86. 
Results 
Manipulation check. An independent samples t-test revealed that participants who read 
the complex description of how the economy operates reported feeling less knowledgeable about 
the economy (M = 4.00, SD = 1.33) than those who read a simple description of how the 
economy operates (M = 4.97, SD = 1.98), t(56) = 2.15, p = .04, d = .57. 
Effects of complexity manipulation. A series of independent samples t-tests revealed that 
the experimental manipulation of complexity had a significant effect on all dependent measures. 
As predicted, those in the complex condition: checked off fewer items on the checklist (M = 
5.07, SD = 2.03) than those in the simple condition (M = 7.23, SD = 3.55), t(56) = 2.77, p = .01, 
d = .74, thus suggesting increased perceptions of helplessness in the complex condition; 
perceived the public as more dependent on the government to manage the economy (M = 4.83, 
SD = 1.93) than those in the simple condition (M = 3.64, SD = 1.71), t(56) = 2.48, p = .02, d = 
.66; trusted the government more (M = 4.94, SD = 1.72) than those in the simple condition (M = 
3.66, SD = 1.77), t(56) = 2.75, p = .01, d = .75; and, finally, reported a greater desire to avoid 
hearing about economic issues (M = 3.12, SD = .90) than those in the simple condition (M = 




To test whether the effect of condition on dependence was mediated by perceived 
helplessness, and whether the effect of dependence on avoidance was mediated by trust in the 
government, I employed AMOS 18.0 structural equation modeling software. The results of this 
model supported my predictions (standardized coefficients and significance values are presented 
in Figure 9). Using the bootstrapping procedure, the indirect path from condition, to 
helplessness, to dependence was found to be significant, CI = .06 to .28, p < .01. Similarly, the 
indirect path from dependence, to trust, to avoidance, was also significant, CI = .02 to .30, p = 
.02. The overall model fit the data well, χ
2
(4, N = 58) = 7.05, p = .13, CFI = 0.94, RMSEA = .12. 
Importantly, alternative models did not fit the data as well (i.e., condition (simple vs. complex) to 
dependence, to avoidance, to trust, χ
2
(4, N = 58) = 8.64, p = .003, CFI = 0.77, RMSEA = .37; 
condition to avoidance, to dependence to trust, χ
2
(4, N = 58) = 16.02, p = .007, CFI = 0.78, 
RMSEA = .20. 
Figure 9: Model testing the associations between domain understanding, helplessness, perceived 
dependence on the government, trust in the government, and avoidance. 
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 Studies 1-6 offered support for individual components of my model. Study 7 adds to this 
by testing the link between dependence, trust, and avoidance, as well as the entire model in one 
experimental design. When participants read a complex description of how the economy 
operates, they exhibited increased perceptions of helplessness in getting through the economic 
downturn, and this in turn predicted an increase in perceived dependence on the government to 
manage the economy. This sense of dependence then predicted increased trust in the government 
to deal with the economy, which in turn predicted an increased desire to “turn a blind eye” to 



















Chapter 9: General Discussion 
 Across seven studies utilizing diverse methodologies I have provided evidence for a 
psychological chain of events that serves to increase system support and status quo maintenance 
in two related ways; first, through increased government trust and support for extant government 
procedures, and second, through the avoidance of information that would challenge this trust and 
might otherwise educate the individual and lead to individual action as opposed to inaction. 
Evidence for this model was found in the context of both novel and familiar issues, including 
energy technology (Studies 1-2), the management and depletion of oil reserves (Study 3), 
environmental disasters (Study 6) and the 2008 economic recession (Studies 4, 5, and 7).  
In the domain of energy, Studies 1 and 2 demonstrated that when participants felt 
unknowledgeable about an issue, they increasingly trusted in the government to manage various 
energy technologies (Studies 1 and 2), and increasingly supported the status quo in how the 
government makes decisions regarding the application of those technologies (Study 2). Study 2 
also highlighted the important role of dependence in this process; when people felt 
unknowledgeable about social issues, they felt more dependent on the government, which led to 
increased trust in the government (also see Kay et al., 2009; van der Toorn et al., 2009).  
However, not only do people trust in the government more when they feel 
unknowledgeable about a threatening social issue, but they also appear motivated to avoid 
learning new information about the issue. In Study 3 it was observed that in the context of an 
imminent oil shortage – as opposed to a distant one – participants who felt that the issue was 
“above their heads” reported an increased desire to adopt an “ignorance is bliss” mentality 




This effect, according to Studies 4-7, is at least partly due to participants’ desire to 
protect their faith in the capable hands of the government. Experimentally increasing domain 
complexity eliminated the tendency for those who felt more affected by the recession to seek out 
more information about the issue. Not only did these individuals avoid negative information, but 
also ambiguous information; that is, the types of information that held the potential (according to 
pre-testing) to challenge the idea that the government can competently manage the economy. 
Positive information was not avoided in the same way (Study 4). Studies 5 and 6 provided 
experimental evidence for the link between trust in the government and avoidance of potentially 
threatening information. Finally, Study 7 tested the full model and documented the mediating 
role of government trust in the relation between unfamiliarity and avoidance.  
Evidence for Motivated Process 
Two key links in the model are proposed to be system-defensive motivational processes. 
These are (i) the link from feelings of government dependence to government trust and (ii) the 
link from feelings of government trust to avoidance of new information.
 
Although past research 
has suggested that system justification effects tend to be motivational (Jost, et al., 2010; Kay et 
al., 2008; 2009; Laurin et al., 2010), none have investigated motivated avoidance as I have 
focused on here. A number of features of the current data, however, provide support for the 
claim that these are motivated processes.  
In Study 3, participants who saw resource management as a complex issue showed an 
increased desire to avoid negative information about a future oil shortage; however, this only 
occurred when the shortage was said to be in the very near future and thus more urgent and self-
relevant to the participants. When it was described as unlikely to be relevant for centuries, 




Study 4, participants induced to feel unknowledgeable about the economy avoided negative and 
ambiguous information, and reported wanting to avoid hearing about the economy, as compared 
to when the economy was framed as a simple issue. Critically, this effect only emerged if 
participants a priori reported that they have been directly affected by the recession. Likewise, 
among those most affected by the BP oil disaster, framing the government as competent and 
trustworthy led to higher levels of avoidance relative to when the government was framed as 
incapable, and no such effect emerged for those not living near the disaster. Finally, in Study 7, 
the link between government trust and avoidance only emerged in the condition where the issue 
was framed as complex. Also important is that the measures of avoidance used in Studies 3, 4, 6, 
and 7 were very face valid measures of motivation to avoid information about the relevant issues 
as opposed to a lack of interest in the issue at hand. 
Theoretical Contributions and Considerations 
 The current research makes several theoretical advances. First, it provides the first 
evidence for feeling unknowledgeable about an issue or domain as an antecedent of the system 
justification motive. In doing so, the motivated avoidance model provides a framework for 
explaining how feeling unknowledgeable, system dependence (Kay et al., 2009; van der Toorn et 
al., 2010), and decreased feelings of personal control (Kay et al., 2008; 2009) relate to one 
another as antecedents to the system justification motive. Specifically, the model shows how 
feeling unknowledgeable serves as a real world, contextual example of how dependence and 
decreased personal control can emerge and activate the system justification motive. Secondly, 
the current research is the first to show that actively avoiding threatening information can be a 
consequence of the system justification motive. Previous research has shown that people will 




2009; Kay, Jimenez, & Jost, 2002; Kay et al., 2005), derogate those that threaten the system 
(Laurin et al., 2010), and dismiss information that threatens the system (Day, Kay, Holmes, & 
Napier, 2011). The current research adds the motivated avoidance of threatening information to 
the list of troubling responses to system threat and the motivation to see the system as just and 
fair. 
 There are aspects of this model that, on the surface, appear to run counter to other 
observations in the political science literature, as well as parallel observations in the relationships 
literature. First, it has been observed that trust and confidence in the government have generally 
gone down in the latter decades of the 20
th
 century (Pharr, Putnam, & Dalton, 2000). This 
decrease has corresponded with many other social changes. One particularly salient example is 
the considerable change in technology and the availability of information that has occurred in the 
past 20 years. On the one hand, these changes may make certain domains beyond laymen’s 
comprehension and capability. Just as automobiles come with computers that are more 
sophisticated than those used to put a man on the moon, thus taking much of the responsibility 
for their repair out of the hands of amateur mechanics, technological and scientific sophistication 
serves as a constraint on understanding many important domains in life, from energy to the 
environment. Similarly, people are bombarded with far more information from more sources 
than in the past. No longer are people limited to one television channel or one newspaper to get 
their information about the world. Instead, people today live in an era of instant, up to the minute 
information, all of which comes from different sources, varying in credibility, sophistication, and 
bias. It therefore seems reasonable to suggest that the issues that we deal with and see every day 
have substantially increased in complexity over time, and our ability to devote time to fully 




research, that as technology advances and the complexity of social problems increases, we 
should see an increase in government trust, and not the decrease that has been observed. Why 
then has trust in the system decreased over time? 
 While technological advancements and the availability of information may complicate 
issues and leave people with more information to digest, it remains that information is simply 
more available than ever before, particularly for those who have grown up with such technology, 
and thus have the skills to effectively discriminate the reliability of information. It may also be 
the case that the mere availability of this information, and the ability of technology to give it to 
us in an instant, leaves people with a feeling of understanding and personal control regarding 
various issues, even if they actually do not have increased knowledge. In other words, the 
knowledge that one could easily find information on an issue may be enough to leave people 
with the impression that they actually do know something about it, or could at a moment’s notice 
if necessary. Therefore, technology and the availability of copious amounts of information likely 
have mixed effects on people’s perceptions of their understanding of public issues, and thus their 
perceptions of government trust. Time will tell whether or not the current decline in government 
trust is permanent, and whether or not the proliferation of technology uniquely contributes to the 
decline in government trust over time. In future research it would be beneficial to gain an 
understanding of the effects of the growing technical complexity of many domains, as well as the 
catch-22 of having information readily available, but also having to deal with potentially 
crippling amounts of it. 
 Research in the interpersonal relationships literature suggests that people will trust those 
on which they are dependent (de Jong, Van der Vegt, & Molleman, 2007) and, in certain 




(Stevens & Fiske, 2000). However, evidence from the risk regulation model (Murray, Derrick, 
Leder, & Holmes, 2008; Murray, Holmes, & Collins, 2006; Murray et al., 2009) suggests that 
trust instead precedes dependence; that is, when an individual is secure in a relationship with 
another person and trusts them, the individual will allow themselves to be dependent on that 
person and bolster that person’s value as a partner. Those who are low in self-esteem lack this 
level of security, and thus tend to pull away from situations of dependence, which in turn has a 
negative impact on trust (Murray et al., 2006).  
 There are a number of differences, however, between personal relationships and one’s 
relationship with the government and the system more broadly. More critically, one does not 
voluntarily opt into a relationship with the system in which one lives. People are born into a 
given society defined by a set of rules, norms, and a government that makes decisions on their 
behalf. This means that one is, by virtue of being born, born into a contract with a system in 
which one is in many ways dependent. In such circumstances, it is easier to change one’s attitude 
about this state of affairs rather than change one’s behaviour, such as by leaving that system for 
another (Laurin, Shepherd, & Kay, 2010), or “going off the grid” and opting out of the various 
benefits and securities that are provided for us by being part of a society. 
 Despite the fact that dependence is only measured and not manipulated in the current 
research, the above points regarding the differences between interpersonal trust and dependence 
and government trust and dependence provide justification for the causal chain in the motivated 
avoidance model. Although research by Murray et al. suggests that trust may come before 
dependence, in the case of the government, this is not likely to be the case because one does not 
choose to opt into a dependent relationship with the government based on trust. Furthermore, 




support for the status quo (Kay et al., 2009; van der Toorn et al., 2010). It may be the case, 
however, that individuals who are chronically low on government trust or have little confidence 
in the system will react to perceived government dependence with decreased trust. Such an 
observation would not be inconsistent with the motivated avoidance model, and would reconcile 
the effects found in the current research and that of Murray et al. (2009). Thus, it is possible that 
dependence leads to trust, but also that trust can shape how people perceive and react to 
dependence. Future research may help to clarify the moderating factors and antecedents that 
determine exactly how people will respond to situations of dependence on the government, with 
chronic trust in the government serving as one possibility. 
There are many phenomena and domains that would provide fruitful grounds for testing 
such moderating factors. Anti-government movements, recently illustrated in the “Tea Party” 
rallies in the United States, exist. Clearly, some people do seek information and become engaged 
when problems are perceived to be severe and/or self-relevant, and some people show reactance 
to feelings of government dependence. What motivates these individuals to seemingly behave in 
ways that go against the predictions and results of the current research? One possibility which 
follows from the above discussion of the risk-regulation model is that these individuals, for any 
number of reasons, distrust the system and/or the government, and therefore respond to 
dependence by withdrawing from that relationship, and increasing their scrutiny and decreasing 
their trust of those to which they are dependent on. 
Another observation is that the Tea Party movement and the Occupy Wall Street 
movement, while being on opposite ends of the political spectrum, share perceptions of group or 
personal power. Both believe that through individual and collective action, change can occur. 




overwhelmed and dependence (recall that the link between domain complexity and dependence 
was mediated by decreased personal power; Study 7), and/or the link between dependence and 
trust. However, it has been observed that perceptions of personal control have decreased over 
time, with younger cohorts feeling less in control of their lives than in the past (Twenge, Zhang, 
& Im, 2004), as well as increased feelings of alienation, cynicism, and distrust (Pharr et al., 
2000). Somewhat paradoxical to this is the observation that narcissism and self-worth have 
actually increased over time (Twenge, Konrath, Foster, Campbell, & Bushman, 2008). 
Therefore, recent political movements such as the Tea Party and Occupy movements may either 
represent a deviation from the downward trend in perceptions of personal control, or a 
consequence of perceived alienation and distrust, coupled with an increase in self-worth, and 
perhaps entitlement. Further research is necessary to understand exactly when feelings of 
alienation lead to less political involvement, or more political involvement, as may be the case in 
the above examples. 
These two protest movements also both see the availability of alternatives, whether that 
alternative is a more regulated financial system, in the case of the Occupy movement, or a 
deregulated one that places trust in the free market and individual freedom, in the case of the Tea 
Party movement. Recent research has shown that when personal power is low, the availability of 
options and choice can serve as an alternative means for restoring personal control (Inesi, Botti, 
Dubois, Rucker, & Galinsky, 2011). To the extent that these groups perceive the availability of 
alternatives in terms of how the system operates, they may be less inclined to trust the existing 
status quo. As may be the case with personal or group power, perceiving alternatives may sever 
the link between issue complexity, dependence, and trust. What may be especially critical here is 




alternatives as relatively simple. For example, Tea Party members and libertarians more 
generally tend to see government regulation and involvement as complicating matters more than 
necessary, and instead place their trust in an unregulated free market that can operate more 
rationally and efficiently. Therefore, although different individuals and groups may deviate from 
the model presented in the current research (based on any number of individual or situational 
differences) in respect to a given target (e.g., the government), they may still engage in 
behaviour that predictably follows from the current model in respect to another target (e.g., the 
free market). For example, it might be the case that libertarians will freely approach information 
that challenges the idea of government regulation, but will avoid information that threatens their 
trust in the free market. 
Other variables may also be important in understanding the various links in the motivated 
avoidance model. Recent research by Feinberg and Willer (2011), for example, has noted that 
individual differences in a belief in a just world predict denial of the severity of global warming 
(especially when it is described as apocalyptic). Although that work focused on belief in global 
warming, and not the inter-relation between feelings of system dependence, government trust, 
and motivated avoidance, as I have done here, it may suggest that individual differences related 
to needs for order, justice, and certainty may moderate the types of effects observed in the 
current research. As such, personal need for structure (Neuberg & Newsom, 1993), need for 
cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982) and need for closure (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994) may be 
likely candidates. For example, people who have a high need to see the world as a just place may 
be more inclined to avoid information when they have placed their faith in the government to 
manage a given issue. Likewise, individuals who are low in a need for cognition or high in need 




feel unknowledgeable about it and may be especially likely to avoid threatening information 
about an issue. Conversely, those high in need for cognition or low in need for closure may be 
more comfortable trying to figure out the issue, perhaps leading to increased feelings of efficacy, 
decreased dependence on and trust in the government, and decreased avoidance. 
Exploring the various potential boundary conditions for the effects documented in my 
research may help to shed some light on which domains and issues are more susceptible and less 
susceptible to these types of effects. Although I have shown my predicted effects across a variety 
of domains, some minor differences emerged between domains. For example, in Study 3, the 
predicted effect of feeling unknowledgeable leading to increased avoidance did not emerge when 
the issue was framed as being in the distant future, and was driven by those who were led to see 
the issue as being urgent. In Study 4, the effect of feeling unknowledgeable on avoidance did not 
emerge in this way. Instead, feeling knowledgeable about the issue (i.e., when it was framed in 
an easy to understand way) led to decreased avoidance, and this intuitive effect was eliminated 
when people felt unknowledgeable about the issue (i.e., when it was framed as complex). 
Critically, however, the predicted effect of domain complexity vs. simplicity emerged among 
those who were most motivated to avoid the issue – that is, when the issue was self-relevant.  
Slight differences such as these may speak to an inherent difference between domains and 
between issue urgency and issue self-relevance as motivators of avoidance, and therefore, 
incremental changes in urgency (e.g., current/long standing issues vs. imminent issues vs. distant 
issues), varying degrees of self-relevance, and other domain characteristics may play a more 
complex role in my model than can be explored in the current research. Therefore, extensions of 
my model to other domains such as food safety, national security, health, social inequality, 




of these different domains and their idiosyncrasies may help to illustrate more clearly when and 
why the various links in the model take place. 
Testing the motivated avoidance model in the domain of consumer behaviour and 
branding may be an especially fruitful direction. Just as we trust in governments and institutions 
to manage public issues, we also trust in products and companies to solve everyday functional 
problems and optimize our lives. Therefore, domain complexity, dependence, and trust should 
relate to products and companies in a similar way as they do with governments. For example, 
geographical differences in income and the availability of goods likely create varying levels of 
perceived dependence on certain companies and brands. Thus, this model may be applied to such 
situations to explain the public’s perceptions of a company or brand. For example, Walmart is 
seen by some as a major employer and a provider of goods at affordable prices, whereas others 
see the company as exploitative and a symbol of corporate greed. Perceptions of personal control 
and dependence might help explain these differences in how such companies are perceived. For 
example, dependence on a company – as determined by income level, the number of local 
employment opportunities, or the number of companies offering the same service – may predict 
trust in the company and perceptions of its benevolence. Such dependence may also lead people 
to avoid potentially threatening information about the company, such as its questionable work 
conditions or environmental impact. The motivated avoidance model may also be applied to 
better understand product loyalty and trust, and the features of a brand or corporate image that 
facilitate trust. 
Finally, although I propose a feedback loop in my model, whereby a lack of knowledge 
can lead to avoidance and avoidance ultimately reinforces a lack of knowledge, I do not provide 




that so long as people are not exposing themselves to information about a given domain, they are 
less able and willing to learn about it. Future research that investigates the long term, cyclical 
effects of avoiding information on the perpetuation of ignorance would nicely complement these 
laboratory studies, and would allow for stronger claims to be made regarding the downstream 
social and political consequences of the processes discussed in the current research.  
Implications for education, and facilitating and optimizing engagement  
 The current data provide evidence for what may be a significant barrier to getting people 
involved and engaged in social issues. Not only are people motivated to avoid social issues when 
they feel issues are complex – thus maintaining their present level of unfamiliarity – but this 
effect appears strongest for those issues believed to be most urgent and serious. It is at times 
when change is most needed, therefore, that people may become the most likely to defend the 
status quo and agents of socio-political systems. As such, the current studies suggest that rather 
than ensuring those in charge are maximally qualified to be in charge, and rather than remaining 
especially attuned to any limitations of the system, the psychological processes that are instigated 
when issues are seen as both severe and complex may limit any criticism of the current system 
and its decision making process. And, perhaps even more critically, they may also prevent the 
types of behaviours, such as information gathering, that are necessary for efficacious social 
action (Attari, DeKay, Davidson, & Bruine de Bruin, 2010; Larrick & Soll, 2008). 
This may help to shed light on why some people may have avoided seeing movies like An 
Inconvenient Truth, and why it has received a great deal of backlash and criticism along with its 
praise and admiration. In both the US and the UK, attempts have been made to ban the film from 
schools, as evidenced by the quote that introduced this thesis. Such criticisms, although likely 




belief that the government and system as a whole can be trusted, especially in the context of 
important issues about which people feel unfamiliar and unknowledgeable.   
It is tempting to make a parallel between trust in the government, and trust in any other 
profession, such as the medical or engineering professions, where there is less if any stigma 
attached to placing blind faith in them as an authority. Society has prescribed that our health is 
placed in the hands of doctors, our safety and structural security in the hands of engineers, and 
relevant to the current research, our social and economic security in the hands of the government.  
Indeed, in a survey on people’s knowledge of economics, 88% of adult respondents thought it 
was very important for politicians to have a good understanding of economics, whereas only 
62% thought the same about average citizens (National Council on Economic Education, 2005).  
There are some important differences, however, between deferring to doctors and 
engineers, on the one hand, and deferring to political leaders, on the other; namely, doctors and 
engineers are clear authorities and experts in their field. In contrast, government officials are not 
necessarily experts in the field of their specific political appointments. For instance, in Canada, a 
politician with a law or business degree can be appointed as the Minister of Environment, Indian 
Affairs, Industry, Heritage, or any number of positions. In the United States, the same principles 
apply. The current Commander-in-Chief (President Barack Obama), for example, has no military 
experience or expertise. Likewise, political appointees – those who head the various government 
agencies – tend to oversee experts, but are not necessarily experts themselves. Michael D. 
Brown, George W. Bush’s appointed head of the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) who was widely criticized for his incompetent management of the Hurricane Katrina 
disaster, is a glaring example of the disconnect that can exist between an individual’s 




Indeed, Brown’s only relevant experience was as an assistant to the city manager of Edmund, 
Oklahama, from 1975-1978 – a position that, according to Time Magazine (Fonda, 2005), was 
more akin to that of an intern or assistant.   
When is it normative or rational to place one’s faith in the government? It is not the 
purpose of this research to suggest that people should never trust the government or that it is 
irrational to do so. Indeed, there are instances when perhaps people should place more faith in 
their institutions, as the issue of too much public involvement in issues can be just as much of a 
problem as not enough involvement. Direct democracy has been problematic for states such as 
California (Fishkin, 2011, The Economist, 2011), with people voting for initiatives and increased 
spending in various areas, but against taxes that would be necessary to pay for them. Having 
citizens this involved in the decision making process may be problematic to the extent that 
citizens are not equipped to make such decisions, and do not fully appreciate the consequences of 
those decisions. Research highlighting the knowledge gap between economists and laypeople, 
and their systematic disagreement on economic issues, strongly suggests that people are not well-
informed to make such decisions (Caplan, 2002). Likewise, there are movements across the 
United States and Canada to ban fluoride from public water, despite opposition from public 
health officials and dentists, and the U.S. Center for Disease Control and Protection calling 
fluoridation one of the greatest medical achievements of the 20
th
 century. Thousands of parents 
opt out of vaccinating their children against deadly diseases based on anecdotal evidence and 
celebrity endorsement, despite the fact that The Lancet retracted the only research claiming a 
causal link between vaccines and autism (Godlee, Smith, & Marcovitch, 2011). These are just a 
few instances in which public involvement and engagement can be problematic when not 




What may be central to this problem is that perceptions of complexity, simplicity, and 
one’s understanding of an issue do not necessarily translate into actual knowledge about the 
domain or issue at hand, and therefore people may freely challenge the status quo, despite not 
fully understanding the issue at hand. Differences between people’s judgments of their 
understanding, and their actual level of understanding, may play different roles in the processes 
that have been outlined in the current research. Individuals who are truly unknowledgeable or 
unskilled in a domain are poor judges of their own performance, erring on the side of 
overestimating their skill level (Dunning et al., 2003). The current research highlights the 
importance of felt understanding, and the experience of feeling unknowledgeable vs. 
knowledgeable in a domain. However, differences may exist between people who are 
unknowledgeable but overestimate their level of knowledge, and those who are accurate judges 
of their own knowledge, whether it is high or low.  
Finally, the current research may ultimately help provide some important information for 
those who seek to educate the public about various issues. These studies demonstrate that when 
people feel that they do not understand a domain or issue, they will disengage from it and 
outsource the solution to the agents of the system. As such, beyond just downplaying the 
catastrophic, doomsday aspects to their messages (Feinberg & Willer, 2011), educators may 
want to consider explaining issues in ways that makes them easily digestible and understandable, 
with a clear emphasis on local, individual-level causes. This may be especially important 
depending on the lay theories (Dweck & Leggett, 1988) that people hold regarding social 
change. That is, people may perceive themselves as able to offer only so much in terms of 
addressing national or global questions. People may assume, for example, that individual 




easily addressable. Problems that involve complex economic rules or the chemical properties of 
the earth’s atmosphere may not fit lay theories of what individuals can accomplish. Indeed, Karl 
Weick’s (1984) theory of small wins supports this notion that people are crippled by the scope of 
many major problems. Therefore, when confronted with these types of problems – or problems 
that are framed in this way – people may withdraw from the issue. To overcome this issue, 
Weick’s proposes, as I do here, that framing a problem as manageable and solvable through 
small individual level behaviours. Uncovering the nature of people’s lay theories about the role 
of individuals in affecting social change, along with other factors,  may help us further 
understand the antecedents to the types of effects observed in the current research. 
Concluding Remarks 
  A burgeoning literature has begun to establish the dynamic relationship between people 
and the external systems (i.e., governments, institutions) within which they operate (e.g., Jost, 
Banaji, & Nosek, 2004; Kay, Whitson, Gaucher, & Galinsky, 2009). This literature, though 
diverse, paints a picture of a social animal that acts not like a dispassionate observer and judge of 
one’s governmental systems, or one who relies on the government and other institutional systems 
solely for the provision of tangible, physical goods (e.g., safety, roads, water), but of someone 
who also leans on the government and other organizations to cope with various psychological 
needs – needs traditionally thought to be handled by the individual alone or, at the very most, via 
the individual’s connections to others (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). It has become clear that 
people turn to their external systems to regulate a number of relational, existential, and epistemic 
threats (Sullivan et al., 2010; Jost et al., 2004; Kay et al., 2009). In the present article, I 




tendency to trust in their social systems, and outsource their worries and fears to these systems, 

























Appendix A: Energy descriptions (Study 1). 
 
Simple description:  
 
Plasma Toroid Fusion: The basis for this new power supply is a newly discovered stable 
grouping of plasma (plasma is simply a super-heated gas that is electrically charged). First, two 
groups of plasma are made separately in a large tube where the process is contained. A magnetic 
field will accelerate the two plasma groups into one another. A collision then occurs between the 
two plasmas, and their material fuses together. When this process occurs, a great deal of energy 
is released, which can be harnessed for energy.  
Electrodynamic Fusion: A fusion device. A magnetic field contains the entire fusion process, 
which simply takes the element boron and fuses a proton to it, which produces a carbon-12 atom. 
This carbon-12 atom is unstable, and quickly decays into other elements (helium and beryllium). 




Plasma Toroid Fusion: This new power supply is a newly discovered stable plasma toroid, the 
electron spiral toroid (EST). Plasma toroids are contained using background gas pressure for 
confinement instead of magnets. One EST will be made in a hydrogen background to trap 
protons (hydrogen ions) inside the EST, while another EST will be made in a boron-11 arc to 
trap boron-11 ions inside the EST. Magnetic field pressure accelerates the two plasma spirals 
into one another, there is a collision between the internal accumulations of ions. Energetic 
helium ions will enable electricity to be produced.   
Electrodynamic Fusion: A fusion device that creates a carbon-12 atom from boron-11. This 
carbon-12 atom decays to beryllium-8 and helium-4. Quasi-spherical magnetic fields trap 
injected energetic particles to form a spherical negative potential well, thus creating free alpha 
particles. The system acts like a spherical colliding beam device. The energy that is created can 





















Cellulosic Biofuel: a fuel made from almost any organic input material, including feedstock, 
waste, and plant material. This material is simply feed into a large tank, where it is exposed to 
micro-organisms/bacteria. These micro-organisms work to breakdown and convert the organic 
material into simple sugars and then into liquid ethanol, which can be used as a fuel. This 
process is comparable to the fermentation process that is used to create alcohol for beverages. 
The high grade ethanol fuel that results from this process can be used to power machines, 
vehicles, or produce electricity for homes. 
Complex description: 
Cellulosic Biofuel: Produced from lignocellulose, a structural material composed mainly of 
cellulose, hemicellulose and lignin. The cellulolysis process consists of hydrolysis on pretreated 
lignocellulosic materials. After the hydrolysis process, C5 cellulose material can be converted by 
exposing the C5 cellulose to microbial cultures that secrete anticellulose enzymes, which 
degrade the C5 cellulose cell walls of the organic material. The high grade fuel that results from 





























Appendix C: Images (Study 2). 
 
Dependence-themed images 
                   
 



































































Appendix D: Descriptions of the economy (Study 4) 
 
Simple description: 
Our global economy, which includes hundreds of countries and billions of people, still operates 
in much the same way as it does at a much, much smaller level: the economy is all about money, 
and the ability to make and exchange money. 
The more money per person, the more opportunities there are.  More incoming money creates 
more economic choices. It means more people can make a decent living providing goods and 
services for others. This is true of any product, or service that can be offered. These goods and 
services are the engine of national income. Raw materials are used to make products that are sold 
for more money than it takes to make them. When more money comes in than goes out, there is 
economic success.  
Complex description: 
 
Today, the global economy is understood as an adaptive nonlinear network (ANN). Other 
ANN’s include the central nervous system, ecologies, immune systems, and the developmental 
states of multi-celled organisms. ANN’s provide for a substantial extension of traditional 
economics. ANN’s allow for intensive nonlinear interactions among large numbers of changing 
agents. These intersections are characterized by limited rationality, adaptation, and increasing 
returns. The usual mathematical tools, exploiting linearity, fixed points and convergence, provide 
only an entering wedge when it comes to understanding ANN’s (e.g.: the global economy). The 

























Appendix E: Article titles (Study 4). 
 
Positive article titles: 
 
Economy: The Worst is Behind Us 
Economy Improves in 2010 into 2011 
Economic Boom in 2011: Experts 
 
Negative article titles: 
 
Economy, jobs expected to remain weak through 2014 
Recession is over, but the future is still grim: Experts 
7 Problems That Could Derail the Global Recovery 
 
Ambiguous article titles: 
 
Tracking the US economy 
Update on the US economy 



































Canada’s Economic Collapse: Can it be Tamed? 
 
 Economically speaking, our parliamentary system can keep the boat from sinking, as stated in a 
series of reports published from August 2008 – October 2008.  
 
Overall, the reports seem to come to a general consensus: that our government, as a whole, 
stabilizes Canada in times of difficulty and instability. 
 
“Considering the various criticisms that individual parties face, it might be surprising to see that 
our system of government, overall, has the ability to keep things in check,” says Dale Collins, an 
economist and professor at the business school at Queen’s University. “The government plays a 
huge role in stabilizing the average Canadian’s income level, quality of life, cost of living, and 
investments in times of difficulty.” 
 
The major theme of the reports is that government actions are effective in maintaining national 
stability. In other words, what the government does to influence the economy has a predictable 
influence on economic trends, and in the grand scheme of things, it is mostly for the better. It 
won’t happen immediately, but according to the reports, they do take effect. 
 
Additional proof comes from the recent survey by the World Economic Forum, which has 
ranked Canada’s banking system as number one in the world, above countries like Sweden and 
Australia.  
 
“The bottom line is that when it comes to your job security in a global market, inflation rates, 
and the cost of food, fuel, and living, the government largely has these things in check in 
comparison to other nations. It’s a stability that is unparalleled anywhere else.”    
 
Dale Collins adds, “I get together every day with fellow economists and colleagues to discuss all 
the issues that are related to the economy, and truth be told, we sleep well at night knowing that 




Government is incapable: 
 
Canada’s Economic Collapse: Can it be Tamed? 
 
Economically speaking, our parliamentary system cannot really keep the boat from sinking, as 
stated in a series of reports published from August 2008 – October 2008.  
 
Overall, the reports seem to come to a general consensus: that our government, as a whole, is 





“Considering the unpredictability of the market, it might not be all that surprising to see that our 
system of government, overall, can’t do much to keep us afloat,” says Dale Collins, an economist 
and professor at the business school at Queen’s University. “The government plays a limited role 
in stabilizing the average Canadian’s income level, quality of life, cost of living, and 
investments.” 
 
The major theme of the reports is that government actions are largely ineffective in maintaining 
national stability. In other words, what the government does to influence the economy has a no 
predictable influence on economic trends. In the grand scheme of things, their actions mostly 
have no impact. 
 
Additional proof comes from the recent survey by the World Economic Forum, which has 
ranked Canada quite low on their list of developed countries (below countries like Sweden and 
Australia), in its ability to stimulate its own market with various government incentives and 
economic interventions.  
 
“The bottom line is that when it comes to your job security in a global market, inflation rates, 
and the cost of food, fuel, and living, the government largely has little to do with how these 
things play out in comparison to other nations.” 
 
Dale Collins adds, “I get together every day with fellow economists and colleagues to discuss all 
the issues that are related to the economy, and truth be told, the government’s role in the 


























Appendix G: Informative article about the economy (Study 5) 
 
What Can (if Anything) the Government Do to Fix the Economy? Are we in a Recession? 
How Bad Can the Economy Get?: Economics 101, and Understanding the Economic Crisis 
 
The events of the past year or so — from the collapse of the housing market and the auto 
industry — have rattled readers. Some are wondering: Just how bad is the economy? The recent 
upending of the housing and financial markets, firstly, is not a good sign. When lenders get 
spooked — and hoard their cash as they’re now doing — the flow of money through the system 
slows down. Eventually, the economy does, too. The drop in home prices may be even more 
worrisome. Hundreds of billions of dollars’ worth of home equity have evaporated, leaving some 
homeowners with a bigger mortgage than their house is worth. That's a big reason why 
consumers are gloomier than they've been in years. Something like 70 percent of our economy 
relies on consumer spending: if it stops, so does economic growth. 
 
How is the current crisis like those in the past?  
 
In 1929, a stock market crash caused the Dow Jones index -- one of the main indices used to 
evaluate the health of the American economy -- to lose nearly 12 percent of its value in one day. 
From Black Tuesday, Oct. 29, 1929, to Nov. 13, 1929, $30 billion simply vanished from the 
United States economy due to falling stock prices. A similar pattern occurred in Canada’s stock 
market as well, as well as in most other countries around the world. 
 
Stock prices are based on the perceived value of the company or investment they represent. 
Much of the North American economy is based on the wealth bought and sold in the stock 
market. So when stock prices fall across the board, the economy falters, too. 
Some historians think that a crash in the Florida real estate market was one of the factors that led 
to the crash of 1929 and the Great Depression that followed. In 1987, another stock market crash 
caused the Dow to drop 508 points in one day -- a loss of 22.6 percent of value. This crash is 
thought to have been generated by a weak dollar and a sudden fleeing of foreign investors. In 
2000, the stock market crashed again when the dot-com bubble burst and highly inflated Internet 
and tech companies lost their value all at once. The total amount of value that tech companies 
lost that year came to an estimated $800 billion. These crashes vary in their time span and 
severity, so how long will the current slump last? 
 
In 2007 and 2008, the North American economy found itself once again teetering on the edge of 
another economic slide. The stock market in North America dropped very rapidly, similar to that 
of what preceded the Great Depression. While some people were optimistic when the market 
showed sharp rebounds in October 2008, with some days showing some of the highest single day 
gains in history, these single day gains are not as good as they seem; similar gains also followed 
the abrupt crash in the 1920’s. In fact, many of the top 20 single day gains in the US and 
Canadian stock market occurred in 1929. Sharp gains and losses like these are characteristic of a 
recession. 
 




The stock market is all about perception. When the market is perceived as healthy -- meaning the 
dollar is strong, the trade deficit is narrow, and the value of companies is high -- investment 
begets investment. When things look bleak, however, a chain reaction of misfortune tends to 
occur. The failure of one section of the economy can lead to another and so on. In 2007, things 
began to look bleak on the North American stock market. This was thanks in large part to the 
subprime mortgage fallout. 
 
Subprime mortgages offered home loans to borrowers who posed a high credit risk. Often, these 
loans were given with attractive terms, like low initial interest rates and no down payment. In 
many cases, they were given for amounts people couldn't otherwise afford. Many of these 
subprime mortgages were issued as adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs). The interest rates on 
these loans reset, generally after two years, and at a higher rate. This increased monthly 
mortgage payments, often to amounts a homeowner couldn't afford. As a result, home 
foreclosures in the United States increased 75 percent from 2006 to 2007.These foreclosures may 
not have had the sweeping effect on the American economy that they did had they not carried so 
many implications for other areas of the financial world. Under previous banking regulations, 
banks simply issued mortgages and kept them, accepting payments over 15 or 30 years until the 
loan was paid off. But in the mid-1990s, restrictions covering loans were eased as part of an 
effort to extend home ownership to more Americans. The result was that mortgages could be 
bought and sold easily. Many subprime mortgages were purchased by stock brokers, lumped 
together into portfolios, and sold as securities. 
 
Because financial institutions like investment banks and securities companies had purchased 
these mortgages, the risk from any fallout was spread across the financial spectrum. As interest 
rates on ARMs reset and increased, so, too, did monthly payments on home loans. Combined 
with additional factors, like auto industry workers who were part of a massive layoff and real 
estate speculators who had purchased homes with ARMs, some people simply walked away from 
their homes -- and the loans that went with them. 
 
But the huge mortgage lenders who actually paid out the money to borrowers to purchase these 
homes suddenly found that the revenue from their monthly payments was drying up -- quickly. 
The largest U.S. home loan lender, Countrywide, reported $1.5 billion in lost revenue during the 
second half of 2007. In 2006, before the subprime fallout, Countrywide made more than $2.5 
billion in profits. And since nonconsumer banks and institutions had become so heavily invested 
in the subprime market, almost all areas of finance became infected with worthless mortgages. 
Even worse, because investors around the world had purchased subprime mortgages as 
securities, the whole global economy suffered from the North American subprime fallout. 
Huge investment banks and major lenders began to go under. People braced for the worst: a 
stock market crash.  
 
Who decides when the economy is in recession, and on what grounds? What actually constitutes 
a recession, anyway? When a nation's economy enters a recession, is life guaranteed to get 
harder for most of its citizens? And how often does a recession lead to a depression? A recession 
is a prolonged period of time when a nation's economy is slowing down, or contracting. Such a 




decrease in factory production, growing unemployment, slump in personal income, and an 
unhealthy stock market. 
 
When the nation is in the early part of a recession, nobody knows for sure if it is actually a 
recession or not. The economy might turn around the next day, which would mean the 
contraction was just a temporary decrease in activity along a mostly upward track. Economists 
don't know if the economy is in recession until they can gather data over a few months. There is 
no strict definition for recession. Different people consider different factors when making the 
assessment.  
 
Some economists and journalists define a recession as two consecutive quarters (three-month 
financial periods in the year) in which the gross domestic product (GDP) decreases. The GDP is 
the value of all the reported goods and services produced by people and institutions operating in 
a country. An overall decrease in the value of goods and services indicates that demand has 
decreased in most markets. If this is the case, it's a good bet that companies have laid people off, 
so unemployment is up. Usually the stock market is also in bad shape when overall value is 
decreasing. In general, the GDP is a pretty good indicator of the overall state of the economy 
  
What Goes Up.... 
 
In a growing economy, consumer demand is increasing, overall, more than it is decreasing. Since 
there is increasing demand, producers want to increase supply. To do this, producers have to 
increase their consumption of other goods and services, including labour. This means there is 
greater demand for labour, so the labour pool, on the whole, can raise the price of their product 
(in other words, people can get paid more for their work).Working people with higher incomes 
have more money to spend on other products, which increases demand even more. If demand is 
high enough, the price of some things goes up. For example, if there are more travelers than there 
are seats on airplanes, airlines can raise their prices to decrease demand. In a growing economy, 
some consumers and producers will not do well, but most will, so the general feeling about the 
economy is good. In such an economy, a lot of consumers tend to make investments: They buy 
things, such as stock in a company, that they plan to sell at a later date. They know that if the 
economy keeps going the way it has been, their investments will increase in value. These 
consumers figure they will make money just by holding onto the product for a while. History has 
proven that an economy will not keep expanding indefinitely -- eventually it will contract. A 
prolonged period of contraction is known as a recession. If the recession lasts long enough, and 
is particularly severe, it is known as a depression. In the next section, we'll find out what happens 
in this sort of economy.  
  
...Must Come Down 
 
Economists say the Canadian economy was expanding steadily from early 1991 to early 2001. 
So why did it stop? There are all kinds of things that can change the course of the economy, just 
as there are all kinds of things that can change the demand for a particular product. In some 
cases, a recession might be kicked off by over-production -- a situation in which the supply 
exceeds the nation's ability to consume. One factor that generally plays a role in a recession, 




If consumers stop feeling confident about their job security or the value of their investments, 
they won't buy as much stuff. In the current recession, a lot of people who have been laid off are 
spending as little as possible, and many people who fear they may be laid off are also saving 
their money. Just as in an expanding economy, things tend to snowball in a contracting economy. 
There are thousands of different elements in this downward spiral; you can see the snowballing 
effect in any number of specific situations. In Canada, the economy follows a somewhat regular 
pattern of expansion and contraction. The economy will typically expand for several years and 
then enter a recession. The point where the recession begins is known as a peak.  
 
Can it be Fixed? 
 
Since it is unhealthy for a nation to be in recession, governments will generally take action to get 
the economy expanding again. While the government's intentions to keep the market from 
crashing may be to protect its citizens' interests, not everyone agrees that action should be taken. 
Correcting the market can simply prolong the problem, some critics say. The best course of 
action could be taking no action at all. Because Canada has a free market economy, theoretically, 
the highs and lows in the market should be affected only by supply and demand. According to 
the free market theory, any institution with enough clout to sway the movement of the market -- 
like the government -- should stay out of the way and let nature take its course. While the 
government doesn't directly intervene in the stock market (say, by inflating the prices of stocks 
when they fall too low), it can attempt to peripherally affect financial markets. 
 
So is there anything a government can do to control a stock market crash? The federal 
governments in Canada and the US have made several efforts and have thought about how to 
keep the markets from falling. But despite the government's efforts to prevent another stock 
market crash, in theory, a free market society isn't supposed to have any intervention in its 
economy. The Federal government has been doing what it can to get money flowing again, but it 
remains to be seen whether it has enough plumbing tools to clear the clog of bad mortgage paper 
choking the financial markets. Since the North American economy is basically a market 
economy, producers are usually free to charge what they want for goods and services, and 
consumers are free to buy goods and services or to not buy goods and services. The forces of 
supply, demand and competition determine how the economy will behave. This system provides 
consumers and producers with a high level of freedom. But this freedom has a price -- it puts the 
economy beyond the control of any single entity. In other words, the government cannot 
automatically set things right when things go wrong -- only the actions of millions of consumers 
and producers can turn the economy around.  
 
The government does have some ways to influence the actions of consumers and producers. 
Raising taxes to pay off the debt isn’t necessarily a great idea. In any case, with the economy 
faltering, now is not the time to raise taxes. Is there anything else that can be done? There are 
two kinds of policies the government can institute that might get the country out of recession: 







With fiscal policies, the government tries to influences the economy by changing how it (the 
government) spends and collects money. The most common fiscal policy actions in a recession 
are: Tax cuts for businesses or for individuals - this gives people and corporations more money, 
which may make them more likely to buy things, which increases demand – and increased 
spending to establish new government jobs – this increases demand for labour, which can lower 
the unemployment rate. Finally, there are automatic fiscal policies, which kick in right away. 
One of the most important automatic fiscal policies is unemployment insurance. This system 
provides an income for people who are out of work. Fiscal policies are dictated by congress and 




Monetary policy involves manipulating the available money supply in the country. The nation's 
central banking institution is the bank for the government itself, as well as for national 
commercial banks. It is also in charge of issuing currency, and it is the main regulating body that 
oversees bank operations.  
 
A nation’s central banking institution has several tools at its disposal for manipulating the 
economy. There are four major things it can do to attempt and curb a recession:   
 
Reduce the reserve ratio - The central banking institution mandates that all national banks keep a 
certain percentage of their assets in one of the Federal Reserve banks, where those assets will 
earn no interest. This money is known as reserves, and the set percentage is called the reserve 
ratio.  
 
A bank's assets constantly fluctuate, so they need to quickly adjust their reserves on a regular 
basis. Banks are not allowed to have too little in reserves, and they don't want to have an excess 
in reserves (this money isn't earning any interest, after all). In order to keep things balanced, a 
bank that suddenly has too little reserves can get an immediate, short-term loan from a bank that 
has an excess. The lending banks charge interest on these loans, at a set rate called the federal 
funds rate. If banks don't have to keep as high a percentage of their assets in reserves, they have 
more accessible money. This might lead them to offer more attractive loans to their customers, 
which can help boost economic growth.  
 
Lower the federal funds rate - This frees up more money for banks, allowing them to offer more 
attractive loans. 
Lower the discount rate (the rate on federal loans) - This frees up money for banks that are 
borrowing money from the central bank. Again, these savings may be passed on to the borrowing 
bank's customers.  
 
Use its own reserve money to buy government bonds - Buying bonds translates to income for the 
U.S. government, which puts more money into the economy.  
 
While these various strategies are convenient, the ability to use them is a double-edged sword. 
While they can be used to try and nudge the economy out of recession (or otherwise influence its 




careful in its actions in order to avoid economic catastrophe. In the end, the course of a nation's 
recession is controlled by the actions of an endless amount of factors. Anything influenced by so 















































Appendix H: Government capability manipulation (Study 6) 
 
 
Government is capable 
 
Expert Panel: Authorities generally capable of dealing with BP oil crisis.  
 
TARA PARKER-POPE 
Published: July 20, 2010  
 
The footage, statements, and actions of the government authorities involved in dealing with the 
BP oil crisis all point to a trustworthiness and ability that people can have some faith in, 
according to a group of experts.  
 
A panel of behavioural scientists, political scientists, ex-political aids, and economists have taken 
stock of the situation, and conclude that our system of government is doing about as good a job 
as can be expected, and have the resources to help the wildlife and residents of the Gulf of 
Mexico.  
 
David Shaw, representing the panel, stated that, “Their body language and their statements 
suggest they are genuinely confident in dealing with the issue, and helping the Gulf’s habitat, 
and the residents of Louisiana and Florida.” He added, “Not only that, but their actions and 
policies suggest that they want things to be cleaned up as soon as possible, and are making a 
significant impact in speeding that process along. Our system of government seems to have the 
resources to deal with this disaster.”  
 
Susan Blackmore, senior political analyst on the panel agreed, saying “There are Republicans 
and Democrats on this panel, and any opinions about the current administration aside, we have 
all concluded that the government, as a broad institution, is largely dealing with the issue, and 
have the resources to do so.”  
 
“There are a lot of government groups and agencies involved in solving this issue. It’s not just 
about the Democrats, but rather a lot of government officials, from several political views. Our 
federal institutions have the resources to solve this problem and preserve the land and water in 
the affected area,” she adds. 
 
Government is incapable: 
 
Expert Panel: Authorities generally incapable of dealing with BP oil crisis.  
 
TARA PARKER-POPE 
Published: July 20, 2010  
 
The footage, statements, and actions of the government authorities involved in dealing with the 





A panel of behavioural scientists, political scientists, ex-political aids, and economists have taken 
stock of the situation, and conclude that our system of government is doing a worse job than 
expected, and lack the resources to help the wildlife and residents of the Gulf of Mexico.  
 
David Shaw, representing the panel, stated that, “Their body language and their statements 
suggest they are not confident in dealing with the issue, and helping the Gulf’s habitat, and the 
residents of Louisiana and Florida.” He added, “Not only that, but their actions and policies 
suggest that while they want things to be cleaned up as soon as possible, they are not making a 
significant impact in speeding that process along. This disaster has pushed the limits of our 
system of government and their resources.”  
 
Susan Blackmore, senior political analyst on the panel agreed, saying “There are Republicans 
and Democrats on this panel, and any opinions about the current administration aside, we have 
all concluded that the government, as a broad institution, is largely unable to deal with the issue, 
and lack the resources to do so.”  
 
“There are a lot of government groups and agencies involved in solving this issue. It’s not just 
about the Democrats, but rather a lot of government officials, from several political views. Our 
federal institutions simply don’t have the resources to solve this problem and preserve the land 






























Appendix I: Measure of perceived helplessness (Study 7) 
 
We are interested in ways that people feel they use their own creativity and abilities to beat the 
recession. What are some ways that you can help make a few extra dollars? 
 
- surveys online 
- mystery shopping 
- rent out a room in my home 
- other online tasks other than surveys (e.g.: being paid to research answers to questions, 
click on ads, etc.) 
- freelance sales (e.g.: selling Avon products) 
- find odd jobs to do (mow lawns, run errands, clean rooms, shovel snow, etc.) 
-  babysitting 
- petsitting 
- dog walking 
-  other: ______ 
 
What are things that you think you can do, or currently do, to save money, but still maintain your 
usual standard of living?  
 
- buying things when they are on sale 
- shopping at thrift stores 
- grow food in your own garden 
- at least sometimes walking to places instead of driving 
- change driving habits to improve fuel economy 
- carpooling 
- get books and movies from the library instead of renting/buying 
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